庞巴迪的未来
- 主题发起人 哈法
- 发布时间 2020-02-17
你这个问题，我还真没办法答复你。就是因为我家有人在庞巴迪工作，所以才投资它的，请解现在怎么走为上策？谢谢
但因为庞巴迪庞大的defined benefit plan的负债（12亿）和公司的业务持续的走下坡，如果是退休人员或是将要退休的话，就要认真的考虑庞巴迪的退休金的问题了。假设很不幸，庞巴迪最后重组，甚至申请破产保护令，庞巴迪的退休金和包括多年来的供款，就会变成一无所有，就像以前的北电和Sears。
我也试过买的股票，因为所谓的Value Trap，而有较大的损失，在这种情况下，我只能卖了。
具体操作建议给不得。
上次危机，股价掉到几毛钱，死定了的公司。可政府投资纾困，股价翻了几番。
GM 清盘前还回光返照地涨了一把，手快的火中取栗，也赚了一把。
BBD 居然今天还撑在 1.65$，要是我，直接市价委托走人，救一个钱是一个钱。
最可气的是那些证卷分析家们，在Yahoo Finance上居然是在Buy和Hold之间是2.3，就没有一个人说那怕是under performance 也好。这使我不仅想起以前环球邮报曾发表过一位在投资公司做投资经理的文章，他在文章中透露，有些证卷分析家因为：1，为了给公司做多生意；2，应被分析公司的要求，而做出对被分析公司利好的评价！
最后编辑: 2020-02-17
庞巴迪不是前年才赢了美国的一场官司，当时有人说它的那个机型就够吃十年的，怎么才两年就不行了？
最后编辑: 2020-02-17
前几天环球邮报有篇报道说，当年庞巴迪把snowmobile的生意卖了后，以为做私人飞机有市场潜力，但没想到大失所望。但我不明白的是现在反而只保留私人飞机的生意。
我记得凡哥是痛心疾首我的目光短浅，这可是高科技，加拿大的宝，十亩地一棵苗，旗下还有这么多员工这么多张嘴，我居然要放任它去死。。凡哥可能买了它的股票
魁省政府的退休金投资了几十亿，想挽回。当年的北电，又不见安省政府挽求。
就业也好，情怀也罢。当年赌政府不会放弃 BBD 就对了，买多少，赚多少。
这种做法不适合我。我对此类股票都是敬而远之。
严格自律，不碰热钱。自我心理管理第一。
今天看了环球邮报的一篇文章，更坚定了我对庞巴迪的评价：是垃圾公司。这篇文章是付费的，我把原文粘贴，有兴趣的不妨看看。@幽香百合 也看看。
我把我认为是重点的部分用红体字表从来：
“Bombardier bets Learjets are the new Ski-Doos ”
When Bombardier Inc. first announced last month it might sell its transportation unit to focus on business jets, analysts knocked the strategy, arguing it would leave the company totally exposed to the highly cyclical aerospace industry.
There is dependable demand for Bombardier trains, argued the financial types. In contrast, is there anything more unpredictable than a billionaire’s appetite for the flying palace that is a new Learjet, Challenger or Global-branded luxury aircraft? Why sell trains to keep planes?
Anyone who follows family-controlled Bombardier’s history has heard this sort of criticism before. And they know the analysts can be dead wrong, while the heirs to the Montreal-based company’s founder, the Beaudoin clan, have got these calls right in the past (although not always - the massive cost overruns on the commercial C Series airliner being a notable example). However, Bombardier’s decision to sell its transport division to France’s Alstom on Monday for US$8.2-billion and focus on the aviation business is in keeping a recipe that has worked for the company in the past.
Back in 2003, the Street was giving Bombardier grief over the capital and management time devoted to what seemed like the ultimate in discretionary products: Ski-Doos and Sea-Doos. In response, the Beaudoin family, which controls Bombardier through a dual share structure, spun out the recreational vehicle division and its supposedly cyclical results to focus on just two divisions, trains and planes.
Getting rid of Ski-Doos is sort of the sensible strategy taught in Harvard Business School. Can’t you hear a professor explaining dabbling in luxury goods is to be avoided, while an enterprise that generates dependable cash flow from a single business, such as making trains, is to be embraced?
How did the Ski-Doo spin work out? Well, the Beaudoin clan and private equity firm Bain Capital bought the division for $1.23-billion 17 years ago. They rolled out new product lines, including three-wheeled motorbikes called Spyders, and shifted manufacturing to Mexico. In 2013, the recreational vehicle maker went public as BRP Inc.
While the stock price bounced around over the past seven years, reflecting shifts in consumer spending, BRP shares are up threefold since the initial public offering, making this a huge win for investors. BRP now sports a market capitalization of $6.7-billion; the company is 50 per cent more valuable than Bombardier. Which tells you the Beaudoin offspring, and the managers they hire, know something about selling expensive toys to wealthy customers.
Can Bombardier chief executive Alain Bellemare replicate the success of BRP? That’s certainly the goal. Mr. Bellemare is an aerospace veteran. He was hired in 2015 to oversee a turnaround. The job featured two major challenges: Paying down debt that ran to more than US$9-billion and focusing Bombardier on what it does best. Both problems may have finally been solved by the Alstom deal.
Going forward, Bombardier will be a business jet maker with an industry-leading US$14.4-billion backlog of orders. The company will introduce new products, in the form of larger planes with greater range. Mr. Bellemare will expand a servicing business that kicks off dependable cash flow by keeping a fleet of more than 4,800 existing Bombardier jets in the air.
Alstom, on the other hand, will shoulder responsibility for fixing a trains business that has been plagued by cost overruns and missed deadlines in recent years. The headaches that come with dealing with a Bombardier factory in Thunder Bay that laid off 550 employees in November – half its work force – are now a Paris-based CEO’s problem.
The path forward won’t be easy. Mr. Bellemare may need to do one more significant deal to pay down more of Bombardier’s US$2.5-billion remaining debt, such as landing in an investment from a private equity fund. He must deal with competitors such as Gulfstream and Cessna that are part of larger aerospace conglomerates. When the next economic downturn comes, as it surely will, Bombardier’s faith in demand for corporate jets will be tested.
However, on Monday, Mr. Bellemare finally shed the bulk of the debt left over from the company’s ill-fated foray into commercial aircraft manufacturing. The Alstom deal signals that five years after he arrived, Mr. Bellemare has determined that going forward, this company makes business jets, and that’s it. For Bombardier, the runway is finally clear.
www.theglobeandmail.com
我把我认为是重点的部分用红体字表从来：
“Bombardier bets Learjets are the new Ski-Doos ”
When Bombardier Inc. first announced last month it might sell its transportation unit to focus on business jets, analysts knocked the strategy, arguing it would leave the company totally exposed to the highly cyclical aerospace industry.
There is dependable demand for Bombardier trains, argued the financial types. In contrast, is there anything more unpredictable than a billionaire’s appetite for the flying palace that is a new Learjet, Challenger or Global-branded luxury aircraft? Why sell trains to keep planes?
Anyone who follows family-controlled Bombardier’s history has heard this sort of criticism before. And they know the analysts can be dead wrong, while the heirs to the Montreal-based company’s founder, the Beaudoin clan, have got these calls right in the past (although not always - the massive cost overruns on the commercial C Series airliner being a notable example). However, Bombardier’s decision to sell its transport division to France’s Alstom on Monday for US$8.2-billion and focus on the aviation business is in keeping a recipe that has worked for the company in the past.
Back in 2003, the Street was giving Bombardier grief over the capital and management time devoted to what seemed like the ultimate in discretionary products: Ski-Doos and Sea-Doos. In response, the Beaudoin family, which controls Bombardier through a dual share structure, spun out the recreational vehicle division and its supposedly cyclical results to focus on just two divisions, trains and planes.
Getting rid of Ski-Doos is sort of the sensible strategy taught in Harvard Business School. Can’t you hear a professor explaining dabbling in luxury goods is to be avoided, while an enterprise that generates dependable cash flow from a single business, such as making trains, is to be embraced?
How did the Ski-Doo spin work out? Well, the Beaudoin clan and private equity firm Bain Capital bought the division for $1.23-billion 17 years ago. They rolled out new product lines, including three-wheeled motorbikes called Spyders, and shifted manufacturing to Mexico. In 2013, the recreational vehicle maker went public as BRP Inc.
While the stock price bounced around over the past seven years, reflecting shifts in consumer spending, BRP shares are up threefold since the initial public offering, making this a huge win for investors. BRP now sports a market capitalization of $6.7-billion; the company is 50 per cent more valuable than Bombardier. Which tells you the Beaudoin offspring, and the managers they hire, know something about selling expensive toys to wealthy customers.
Can Bombardier chief executive Alain Bellemare replicate the success of BRP? That’s certainly the goal. Mr. Bellemare is an aerospace veteran. He was hired in 2015 to oversee a turnaround. The job featured two major challenges: Paying down debt that ran to more than US$9-billion and focusing Bombardier on what it does best. Both problems may have finally been solved by the Alstom deal.
Going forward, Bombardier will be a business jet maker with an industry-leading US$14.4-billion backlog of orders. The company will introduce new products, in the form of larger planes with greater range. Mr. Bellemare will expand a servicing business that kicks off dependable cash flow by keeping a fleet of more than 4,800 existing Bombardier jets in the air.
Alstom, on the other hand, will shoulder responsibility for fixing a trains business that has been plagued by cost overruns and missed deadlines in recent years. The headaches that come with dealing with a Bombardier factory in Thunder Bay that laid off 550 employees in November – half its work force – are now a Paris-based CEO’s problem.
The path forward won’t be easy. Mr. Bellemare may need to do one more significant deal to pay down more of Bombardier’s US$2.5-billion remaining debt, such as landing in an investment from a private equity fund. He must deal with competitors such as Gulfstream and Cessna that are part of larger aerospace conglomerates. When the next economic downturn comes, as it surely will, Bombardier’s faith in demand for corporate jets will be tested.
However, on Monday, Mr. Bellemare finally shed the bulk of the debt left over from the company’s ill-fated foray into commercial aircraft manufacturing. The Alstom deal signals that five years after he arrived, Mr. Bellemare has determined that going forward, this company makes business jets, and that’s it. For Bombardier, the runway is finally clear.
Opinion: Bombardier bets Learjets are the new Ski-Doos
How did the Ski-Doo spin work out? BRP shares are up threefold since the initial public offering, making this a huge win for investors
www.theglobeandmail.com
Long Vacation
狮子大开口
政府考虑的是就业，
很多中年老年人，职业生涯已经过去一大半，怎么转型？
他们抚养的孩子可以去滑铁卢，念IT，找新兴行业。
救老就是救小。
很多中年老年人，职业生涯已经过去一大半，怎么转型？
他们抚养的孩子可以去滑铁卢，念IT，找新兴行业。
救老就是救小。
我也同样套牢在大麻股上了。感觉还有机会。
从上面的文章可以看出：在2003年时（当时庞巴迪的股价，已由最高峰时的26元左右，大幅下跌到4元左右），庞巴迪家族不仅没有想办法去挽救公司，反而分拆了一些生意，并组成了一家名为BRP Inc，并与私人投资公司以12.3亿买了这家公司。在2013年把BRP Inc 上市，现在市值66亿，几乎是庞巴迪的一倍！
多元化的公司，在有需要时，是会分拆的，目的有两个：
1，因为被分拆的，需要不断的持续的资本投资，但这种投资的效果并不明朗，并会有居大的风险，对母公司不仅没有带来利润，甚至有可能拖累母公司。最明显的例子就是BCE 在2000年分拆Nortel（北电），2009年Nortel宣告破产。可见BCE 当年的分拆是多么的正确，否则的话，BCE有可能被Nortel拖垮。
2，因为母公司的业务过于庞大，分拆出去，便于管理，而且更能体现被分拆的价值，同时母公司仍然持有分拆公司的控制权，这些分公司的利润照母公司控制权的比例，分给母公司。最明显的例子是Power Corporation of Canada (我持有它的股票)，属下有Great-West Lifeco Inc， Power Financial Corporation 和IGM Financial Inc。
然而庞巴迪家族却是不理母公司的死活，不理股东的利益，只顾着自己家族的利益，简直是混蛋家族！
多元化的公司，在有需要时，是会分拆的，目的有两个：
1，因为被分拆的，需要不断的持续的资本投资，但这种投资的效果并不明朗，并会有居大的风险，对母公司不仅没有带来利润，甚至有可能拖累母公司。最明显的例子就是BCE 在2000年分拆Nortel（北电），2009年Nortel宣告破产。可见BCE 当年的分拆是多么的正确，否则的话，BCE有可能被Nortel拖垮。
2，因为母公司的业务过于庞大，分拆出去，便于管理，而且更能体现被分拆的价值，同时母公司仍然持有分拆公司的控制权，这些分公司的利润照母公司控制权的比例，分给母公司。最明显的例子是Power Corporation of Canada (我持有它的股票)，属下有Great-West Lifeco Inc， Power Financial Corporation 和IGM Financial Inc。
然而庞巴迪家族却是不理母公司的死活，不理股东的利益，只顾着自己家族的利益，简直是混蛋家族！
这个Power Corporation of Canada 有点意思，Great-West Lifeco Inc不是上市公司吗？我们公司的保险就是在他家买的。
Great-West Lifeco Inc是上市公司。Power Corporation of Canada前些日子以1.05股Power Corporation of Canada 换一股Power Financial Corporation（是上市公司)再加上每股0.01现金，全部买回除了Power Corporation of Canada所持有的Power Financial Corporation之外的股票。
注册或登录来发表评论
您必须是注册会员才可以发表评论
注册帐号
注册帐号. 太容易了!
登录
已有帐号? 在这里登录.
