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回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
Here comes the recession
Here comes the recession
- 主题发起人 笨鸡003
- 发布时间 2007-10-19
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
在美联储22日降息75个基点后，香港金管局23日也将基准利率从5.75%下调至5%。
综合外电1月23日报道，香港金融管理局(Hong Kong MonetaryAuthority,简称：金管局)23日将基准利率下调0.75个百分点，从5.75%降至5.00%，追随了前夜美国联邦公开市场委员会(U.S.FederalOpen Market Committee, 简称FOMC)出乎意料的减息举措。
港元汇率与美元挂钩令香港的货币政策与美国紧密相连，因此金管局通常会追随美国联邦储备委员会(FederalReserve,简称Fed)的利率调整。
金管局已承诺维持基础利率较美国联邦基金利率高出至少1.5个百分点。香港基础利率是金管局通过贴现窗口向本地银行隔夜拆款的参考利率。
Fed22日宣布将联邦基金目标利率从4.25%下调至3.5%，提前在1月29-30日例行货币政策会议前下调了利率。FOMC上次减息是在07年12月，当时金管局也随之降息。
香港各银行有权自行决定是否随金管局的利率决定来调整其存贷款利率。预计香港本地银行23日晚些时候将宣布各自的利率决定。
在美联储22日降息75个基点后，香港金管局23日也将基准利率从5.75%下调至5%。
综合外电1月23日报道，香港金融管理局(Hong Kong MonetaryAuthority,简称：金管局)23日将基准利率下调0.75个百分点，从5.75%降至5.00%，追随了前夜美国联邦公开市场委员会(U.S.FederalOpen Market Committee, 简称FOMC)出乎意料的减息举措。
港元汇率与美元挂钩令香港的货币政策与美国紧密相连，因此金管局通常会追随美国联邦储备委员会(FederalReserve,简称Fed)的利率调整。
金管局已承诺维持基础利率较美国联邦基金利率高出至少1.5个百分点。香港基础利率是金管局通过贴现窗口向本地银行隔夜拆款的参考利率。
Fed22日宣布将联邦基金目标利率从4.25%下调至3.5%，提前在1月29-30日例行货币政策会议前下调了利率。FOMC上次减息是在07年12月，当时金管局也随之降息。
香港各银行有权自行决定是否随金管局的利率决定来调整其存贷款利率。预计香港本地银行23日晚些时候将宣布各自的利率决定。
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
lalababy..........
2007年是熊牛交战。
2008年小熊笨笨到了美国，把蒙蒙牛赶走了！
现在DJIA是down trend。没必要和市场对抗！还没进场者先离场静观！
USD400billion的sub-prime 和USD200 billions的credit defaults不是一两年能轻易的解决的。降息和减税只是短暂的让你能治标不治本的方案，如果没有这credit crisis,美国应该升息而不应该减息！
75基点的紧急减息是美国进入经济萧条的证明。估计这几个月北美基金会在新兴市场撤出，把钱带回大本营救市！过后你就会看到中东油钱这里注资，那里注资。很多中东和平协议就会在美国的“支持”下落实！！
今天香港被压低。其他亚太股上涨，欧洲也上涨，估计北美今天也上涨！
让大鳄鱼炒高，小鱼进场！要玩就玩day trade。但股市不是赌博。如果要赌博，我建议你去Las Vegas或Macao，你赢钱的机会比day trade 股市大！
lalababy..........
2007年是熊牛交战。
2008年小熊笨笨到了美国，把蒙蒙牛赶走了！
现在DJIA是down trend。没必要和市场对抗！还没进场者先离场静观！
USD400billion的sub-prime 和USD200 billions的credit defaults不是一两年能轻易的解决的。降息和减税只是短暂的让你能治标不治本的方案，如果没有这credit crisis,美国应该升息而不应该减息！
75基点的紧急减息是美国进入经济萧条的证明。估计这几个月北美基金会在新兴市场撤出，把钱带回大本营救市！过后你就会看到中东油钱这里注资，那里注资。很多中东和平协议就会在美国的“支持”下落实！！
今天香港被压低。其他亚太股上涨，欧洲也上涨，估计北美今天也上涨！
让大鳄鱼炒高，小鱼进场！要玩就玩day trade。但股市不是赌博。如果要赌博，我建议你去Las Vegas或Macao，你赢钱的机会比day trade 股市大！
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
上个星期看到的文章！分享！
This is not merely a subprime crisis
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: January 13 2008 19:06 | Last updated: January 14 2008 06:57
If this had been a mere subprime crisis, it would now be over. But it is not, and nor will it be over soon. The reason is that several other pockets of the credit market are also vulnerable. Credit cards are one such segment, similar in size to the subprime market. Another is credit default swaps, relatively modern financial instruments that allow bondholders to insure against default. Those who such sell such protection receive a quarterly premium, based on a percentage of the amount insured. The CDS market is worth about $45,000bn (€30,500bn, £23,000bn). This is not an easy figure to imagine. It is more than three times the annual gross domestic product of the US. Economically, credit default swaps are insurance. But legally, they are not, which is why this market is largely unregulated. Technically, they are swaps: two parties swap payments streams – one pays a regular premium for protection, the other pays up in case of default. At a time of low insolvency rates, many investors used to consider the selling of protection as a fairly risk-free way of generating a steady stream of income. But as insolvency rates go up, so will be the payment obligations under the CDS contracts. If insolvencies reach a certain level, one would expect some protection sellers to default on their obligations.
So the general health of this market crucially depends on the rate of insolvencies. This in turn depends on the economy. The US and Europe are the two largest CDS markets in the world. It is now widely recognised, including by the Federal Reserve, that the US economy is heading for a sharp downturn, possibly a recession. The eurozone, too, is heading for a downturn, but possibly not quite as sharp.
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the average length of US recession, excluding the 2001 recession, was 11 months. The 2001 recession was shorter, which brings down the average to about 10 months. The US has been quite lucky. Germany, for example, suffered a downturn at the beginning of this decade. It lasted a near eternity – 15 quarters – and included two separate technical recessions. Interestingly, and perhaps most relevant to today's debate, is the fact that this downturn was also aggravated by a national credit squeeze. German banks cleaned up their balance sheets after a decade of binge-lending. The German experience has taught us that persistent problems in financial transmission channels cause long economic downturns. Today, the really important question is not whether the US can avoid a sharp downturn. It probably cannot. Far more important is the question of how long such a downturn or recession will last. An optimistic scenario would be a short and shallow downturn. A second-best scenario would be for a sharp, but still short, recession.
A truly awful scenario would be a long recession. The US did experience some longish recessions in the past, for example from November 1973 until March 1975, but there was no CDS market around at the time.
So what then would be the effects of these scenarios on the CDS market? Bill Gross of Pimco*, who runs the world's largest bond fund, last week produced an interesting back-of-the-envelope calculation that received widespread publicity. He projected that the losses from credit default swaps caused by a rise in bankruptcies could be $250bn or more – which would be similar to the expected total loss as a result of subprime.
This is how he arrived at this estimate. His calculation assumes that the corporate insolvency rate would return to a normal level of 1.25 per cent (measured as the default rate of all investment grade and junk debt outstanding). As the entire CDS market is worth about $45,000bn, $500bn in CDS insurance would be triggered under this assumption. The protection sellers would probably be able to recover some of this, so the net loss would come to about half of that. This estimate is very rough, of course. Most important, it is based on the assumption that the hypothetical US recession would not turn into a prolonged slump. In that case, one would expect corporate default rates not merely to return to trend, but to overshoot in the other direction.
So one could take that calculation as a starting point. A downturn lasting two years could easily trigger payments streams of a multiple of $250bn. At this point we might be tempted to conclude that this all is irrelevant, since this is only insurance, which is a zero-sum financial game. The money is still there, only somebody else has got it. But in the light of the current liquidity conditions in financial markets, that would be a complacent view to take. If protection sellers were to default en masse, so too could some protection buyers who erroneously assume that they are protected. Given that the CDS market is largely unregulated there is no guarantee of sufficient liquidity behind each contract. It is not difficult at all to see how the CDS market has the potential to cause serious financial contagion. The subprime crisis came fairly close to destabilising the global financial system. A CDS crisis, under a pessimistic scenario, could produce a global financial meltdown.
This is not a prediction of what will happen, merely a contingent scenario. But it is contingent on an event – a nasty and long recession – that is not entirely improbable.
上个星期看到的文章！分享！
This is not merely a subprime crisis
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: January 13 2008 19:06 | Last updated: January 14 2008 06:57
If this had been a mere subprime crisis, it would now be over. But it is not, and nor will it be over soon. The reason is that several other pockets of the credit market are also vulnerable. Credit cards are one such segment, similar in size to the subprime market. Another is credit default swaps, relatively modern financial instruments that allow bondholders to insure against default. Those who such sell such protection receive a quarterly premium, based on a percentage of the amount insured. The CDS market is worth about $45,000bn (€30,500bn, £23,000bn). This is not an easy figure to imagine. It is more than three times the annual gross domestic product of the US. Economically, credit default swaps are insurance. But legally, they are not, which is why this market is largely unregulated. Technically, they are swaps: two parties swap payments streams – one pays a regular premium for protection, the other pays up in case of default. At a time of low insolvency rates, many investors used to consider the selling of protection as a fairly risk-free way of generating a steady stream of income. But as insolvency rates go up, so will be the payment obligations under the CDS contracts. If insolvencies reach a certain level, one would expect some protection sellers to default on their obligations.
So the general health of this market crucially depends on the rate of insolvencies. This in turn depends on the economy. The US and Europe are the two largest CDS markets in the world. It is now widely recognised, including by the Federal Reserve, that the US economy is heading for a sharp downturn, possibly a recession. The eurozone, too, is heading for a downturn, but possibly not quite as sharp.
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the average length of US recession, excluding the 2001 recession, was 11 months. The 2001 recession was shorter, which brings down the average to about 10 months. The US has been quite lucky. Germany, for example, suffered a downturn at the beginning of this decade. It lasted a near eternity – 15 quarters – and included two separate technical recessions. Interestingly, and perhaps most relevant to today's debate, is the fact that this downturn was also aggravated by a national credit squeeze. German banks cleaned up their balance sheets after a decade of binge-lending. The German experience has taught us that persistent problems in financial transmission channels cause long economic downturns. Today, the really important question is not whether the US can avoid a sharp downturn. It probably cannot. Far more important is the question of how long such a downturn or recession will last. An optimistic scenario would be a short and shallow downturn. A second-best scenario would be for a sharp, but still short, recession.
A truly awful scenario would be a long recession. The US did experience some longish recessions in the past, for example from November 1973 until March 1975, but there was no CDS market around at the time.
So what then would be the effects of these scenarios on the CDS market? Bill Gross of Pimco*, who runs the world's largest bond fund, last week produced an interesting back-of-the-envelope calculation that received widespread publicity. He projected that the losses from credit default swaps caused by a rise in bankruptcies could be $250bn or more – which would be similar to the expected total loss as a result of subprime.
This is how he arrived at this estimate. His calculation assumes that the corporate insolvency rate would return to a normal level of 1.25 per cent (measured as the default rate of all investment grade and junk debt outstanding). As the entire CDS market is worth about $45,000bn, $500bn in CDS insurance would be triggered under this assumption. The protection sellers would probably be able to recover some of this, so the net loss would come to about half of that. This estimate is very rough, of course. Most important, it is based on the assumption that the hypothetical US recession would not turn into a prolonged slump. In that case, one would expect corporate default rates not merely to return to trend, but to overshoot in the other direction.
So one could take that calculation as a starting point. A downturn lasting two years could easily trigger payments streams of a multiple of $250bn. At this point we might be tempted to conclude that this all is irrelevant, since this is only insurance, which is a zero-sum financial game. The money is still there, only somebody else has got it. But in the light of the current liquidity conditions in financial markets, that would be a complacent view to take. If protection sellers were to default en masse, so too could some protection buyers who erroneously assume that they are protected. Given that the CDS market is largely unregulated there is no guarantee of sufficient liquidity behind each contract. It is not difficult at all to see how the CDS market has the potential to cause serious financial contagion. The subprime crisis came fairly close to destabilising the global financial system. A CDS crisis, under a pessimistic scenario, could produce a global financial meltdown.
This is not a prediction of what will happen, merely a contingent scenario. But it is contingent on an event – a nasty and long recession – that is not entirely improbable.
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
现在最需要的是子弹！
Cash is the KING!
Put your money in the bank or invest in the bond fund or money market fund! Please be patient and do invest in the share market in 2009!
I don't think that this is a good time to invest in share market, as we know that the economic recession is about the corner!
现在最需要的是子弹！
Cash is the KING!
Put your money in the bank or invest in the bond fund or money market fund! Please be patient and do invest in the share market in 2009!
I don't think that this is a good time to invest in share market, as we know that the economic recession is about the corner!
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
Please take care!
法国兴业银行发生问题了！！！
It seems that abnormal on the Europe market! The share market may drop today during the end session! Please take care!
__________________________________________________
UPDATE: Societe Generale Says Trader's Fraud Led To $7.1 Billion Loss
January 24, 2008: 04:41 AM EST
LONDON (Dow Jones) -- French banking group Societe Generale said Thursday it has uncovered a massive 4.9 billion-euro ($7.1 billion) fraud linked to a single rogue futures trader.
The group also said it will post additional write-downs of 2.05 billion euros in the fourth quarter, and is planning a 5.5 billion-euro capital increase in the next few weeks.
SocGen , France's second-largest bank, said the fraudulent trades were made in 2007 and 2008. The trader, whose role at the bank was to make "plain vanilla" hedges on European stock-market indexes, used his knowledge of the bank's control procedures "to conceal these positions through a scheme of elaborate fictitious transactions," the bank added in a statement.
Shares in SocGen were halted from trading early Thursday.
The group said there's no residual exposure to the positions, which were discovered and investigated on Jan. 19. The 4.9 billion-euro cost of the fraud is before tax and includes losses from its decision to close the positions as quickly as possible.
SocGen said it has begun dismissal proceedings against the trader. His direct supervisor will also leave the group. But SocGen added its board of directors rejected CEO Daniel Bouton's offer to resign.
The size of the fraud dwarfs that of famous rogue trader Nick Leeson, who racked up losses of around $1.4 billion at Barings Bank in 1995. Leeson's actions led to the collapse of Barings. He was convicted of fraud and sentenced to a jail term of six and a half years.
French rival Credit Agricole also recently revealed losses from unauthorized trades, although on a much smaller scale. The bank said in September that it would cost around 250 million euros to unwind trades in credit market indexes made at the New York offices of its Calyon unit.
Further write-downs
SocGen said its additional write-downs consist of 1.1 billion euros related to U.S. residential mortgage risk and 550 million euros linked to its exposure to U.S. bond insurers. There's also a further 400 million euros of unallocated additional provisions.
The write-downs and fraud will leave SocGen with a profit of just 600 million euros to 800 million euros in 2007, while the corporate and investment banking arm will post a net loss of 2.3 billion euros for the year.
Analysts polled by Thomson Financial had expected the bank to earn 5.23 billion euros this year.
In order to strengthen its capital position, the bank will launch a capital increase with preferential subscription rights of 5.5 billion euros, fully underwritten by J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley.
French rival BNP Paribas was quick to clarify that it hadn't found any major issues with its results, which will be released next week.
"Neither any loss nor any other matter has been revealed, whose importance would justify a market warning," BNP said in a statement.
Shares in BNP advanced 6.8% as the wider banking sector rallied. Among other banks, Credit Agricole gained 5.5%, Barclays (BCS) added 5.6% and Deutsche Bank jumped 6%.
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djhighlights/200801240441DOWJONESDJONLINE000469.htm
Please take care!
法国兴业银行发生问题了！！！
It seems that abnormal on the Europe market! The share market may drop today during the end session! Please take care!
__________________________________________________
UPDATE: Societe Generale Says Trader's Fraud Led To $7.1 Billion Loss
January 24, 2008: 04:41 AM EST
LONDON (Dow Jones) -- French banking group Societe Generale said Thursday it has uncovered a massive 4.9 billion-euro ($7.1 billion) fraud linked to a single rogue futures trader.
The group also said it will post additional write-downs of 2.05 billion euros in the fourth quarter, and is planning a 5.5 billion-euro capital increase in the next few weeks.
SocGen , France's second-largest bank, said the fraudulent trades were made in 2007 and 2008. The trader, whose role at the bank was to make "plain vanilla" hedges on European stock-market indexes, used his knowledge of the bank's control procedures "to conceal these positions through a scheme of elaborate fictitious transactions," the bank added in a statement.
Shares in SocGen were halted from trading early Thursday.
The group said there's no residual exposure to the positions, which were discovered and investigated on Jan. 19. The 4.9 billion-euro cost of the fraud is before tax and includes losses from its decision to close the positions as quickly as possible.
SocGen said it has begun dismissal proceedings against the trader. His direct supervisor will also leave the group. But SocGen added its board of directors rejected CEO Daniel Bouton's offer to resign.
The size of the fraud dwarfs that of famous rogue trader Nick Leeson, who racked up losses of around $1.4 billion at Barings Bank in 1995. Leeson's actions led to the collapse of Barings. He was convicted of fraud and sentenced to a jail term of six and a half years.
French rival Credit Agricole also recently revealed losses from unauthorized trades, although on a much smaller scale. The bank said in September that it would cost around 250 million euros to unwind trades in credit market indexes made at the New York offices of its Calyon unit.
Further write-downs
SocGen said its additional write-downs consist of 1.1 billion euros related to U.S. residential mortgage risk and 550 million euros linked to its exposure to U.S. bond insurers. There's also a further 400 million euros of unallocated additional provisions.
The write-downs and fraud will leave SocGen with a profit of just 600 million euros to 800 million euros in 2007, while the corporate and investment banking arm will post a net loss of 2.3 billion euros for the year.
Analysts polled by Thomson Financial had expected the bank to earn 5.23 billion euros this year.
In order to strengthen its capital position, the bank will launch a capital increase with preferential subscription rights of 5.5 billion euros, fully underwritten by J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley.
French rival BNP Paribas was quick to clarify that it hadn't found any major issues with its results, which will be released next week.
"Neither any loss nor any other matter has been revealed, whose importance would justify a market warning," BNP said in a statement.
Shares in BNP advanced 6.8% as the wider banking sector rallied. Among other banks, Credit Agricole gained 5.5%, Barclays (BCS) added 5.6% and Deutsche Bank jumped 6%.
http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djhighlights/200801240441DOWJONESDJONLINE000469.htm
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
再来一个消息！看你还敢现在进场吗？！！！
————————————————————————————————————
华尔街传花旗集团可能申请破产保护 2008年01月24日
1月24日讯 由于花旗集团并没有收到来自中东投资者，特别是阿布扎比投资管理局75亿美元的投资，华尔街盛传该集团有可能将申请破产保护。
此前有报道称花旗负资产按揭可能高达754亿美元，如果经济陷入衰退，随着消费者无力偿还信用卡和汽车贷款，花旗可能需要计入更多亏损，为此，花旗在第四财季计提74亿美元潜在贷款损失准备金可能远远不足。一位摩根士丹利不愿意公开姓名的分析师表示，“花旗财报埋伏着很多炸弹，仅负资产按揭一项可能就相当严重。”
至于申请破产保护这一传闻的真假尚难判断，也不排除是某些交易机构为操作花旗短期股价而放出的虚假消息。目前花旗集团正在为平衡资产负债表积极地做着努力。
再来一个消息！看你还敢现在进场吗？！！！
————————————————————————————————————
华尔街传花旗集团可能申请破产保护 2008年01月24日
1月24日讯 由于花旗集团并没有收到来自中东投资者，特别是阿布扎比投资管理局75亿美元的投资，华尔街盛传该集团有可能将申请破产保护。
此前有报道称花旗负资产按揭可能高达754亿美元，如果经济陷入衰退，随着消费者无力偿还信用卡和汽车贷款，花旗可能需要计入更多亏损，为此，花旗在第四财季计提74亿美元潜在贷款损失准备金可能远远不足。一位摩根士丹利不愿意公开姓名的分析师表示，“花旗财报埋伏着很多炸弹，仅负资产按揭一项可能就相当严重。”
至于申请破产保护这一传闻的真假尚难判断，也不排除是某些交易机构为操作花旗短期股价而放出的虚假消息。目前花旗集团正在为平衡资产负债表积极地做着努力。
回复: 一桶石油一百美元的时代
花旗财报深水炸弹 负资产按揭可能高达754亿美元 2008年01月24日 谭璐 查晓磊 香港报道
美联储在1月22日紧急减息75个基点之后，当天的美股低开后反弹。不过花旗继续跌势，收报24.40美元，下跌0.2%。1月15日公布第四季度业绩当天，花旗在纽交所的股价就应声下挫了7.3%，收报26.94美元，从近一年来最高点的55.55美元下跌了51.5%。
花旗上周的业绩报告显示，相关次按的拨备达181亿美元，使亏损达98.3亿美元，这两个数字使花旗成为次按危机中受伤最重的银行之一。上周花旗业绩报告出台之后，标准普尔将花旗的信贷评级降为AA-。不过，标准普尔的大中华区资深董事曾怡景对本报记者表示，花旗的股价与评级并没有直接关系，股价所反映的是市场对于这家银行的判断。
雷曼兄弟的高级副总裁兼全球首席经济学家Paul Sheard对本报记者表示，次按危机波及全球多个地区，估计美国经济衰退的几率大概有40%，不过他没有评论次按危机中银行业的损失情况。
一位摩根士丹利不愿意公开姓名的分析师表示，“花旗财报埋伏着很多炸弹，仅负资产按揭一项可能就相当严重。”
负资产按揭或高达754亿美元
在国内消费信贷方面，花旗产生了41亿美元的损失，主要包括6.9亿美元的高等级信贷净损失和33.1亿美元的净贷款损失准备。信贷损失的增加，主要包括一次住房按揭和二次住房按揭的违约率增长，以及未保护的个人贷款、信用卡和汽车贷款等方面的损失。
目前花旗的一次楼按和二次楼按的信贷规模一共2144亿美元。业绩报告上的LTV指标(loan to value ratio， 指楼按对楼宇价值的比率)显示花旗按揭有很大的比例已经暴露于风险之中，楼价下跌将对银行产生很大影响。香港的银行在贷款时LTV以70%为标准，而美国这方面的标准比较高。
根据花旗官方发布的业绩简报(Fourth Quarter 2007 Earnings Review)，在花旗的楼按组合中，一次楼按为共有1514亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按1074.94亿美元，占一次楼按的71%；LTV在80%-90%之间的136.26亿美元，占一次楼按的9%；而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按302.8亿美元，占花旗一次楼按的20%。
一次楼按29%的部分处于危险状态，即楼价下跌20%，这部分资产都会变成负资产按揭。高盛在1月15日发布的一份研究报告预计，美国楼价将由高峰至低点会跌20%至25%。按照这种估算，花旗持有的一次负资产按揭可能将在439.06亿美元以上。
花旗的报告也显示，其二次楼按共630亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按315亿美元，占二次楼按的50%；LTV在80%-90%之间的100.8亿美元，占二次楼按的16%；而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按214.2亿美元，占二次楼按的34%，比例也相当高。按照高盛对于楼价未来走势的估计，花旗二次楼按变成负资产按揭的比例将超过50%，即至少有315亿美元二次楼按贷款规模超过抵押房屋的价值。
两项相加，一、二次楼按可能变为负资产按揭的规模高达754亿美元。
如果经济陷入衰退，随着消费者无力偿还信用卡和汽车贷款，花旗和其他银行可能需要计入更多亏损，为此，花旗在第四财季计提74亿美元潜在贷款损失准备金可能远远不足。
1月23日，投资银行雷曼兄弟高级副总裁兼亚太区首席经济学家苏博文接受本报采访时表示，上星期美国政府推出1500亿美元的救市措施，虽然这些措施出台得比较迟，不过相信行政手段刺激经济的成效将于今年第二季度开始显现，美国第二季度的GDP可能会因为救市措施而增加1%。
CDO资产得再冲减
花旗的巨额亏损主要受次贷损失和国内消费信贷两方面的影响。在次按风暴中出问题的，是把次按等资产打包而成的债务抵押债券(Collateralized debt obligation，CDO)，以及用CDO作抵押品发行的商业票据。花旗的业绩报告显示，拨备的181亿美元来自定息债券市场部门，包括143亿美元的高信用等级资产支持债券CDO，和29亿美元的借贷和结构性产品。
截至去年9月底，花旗有关CDO的数额是546亿美元，第四季减值181亿美元，比例达到33.2%，因此到2007年底，花旗的CDO规模降为373亿美元。不过，美国Tavakoli Structured Finance Inc的总裁Janet Tavakoli表示，花旗可能需要再减值33亿美元。Janet Tavakoli认为CDO的市场价格比较低，花旗的资产冲减并没有完全反映当前的市场价格。如果用市场价格来计算，花旗的冲减总额应达到210亿美元左右。
花旗的首席财务官Gary Crittenden在回应上述指责时说，花旗已经进行了“认为适当的冲减”。花旗使用了各种模型来对债券进行估价。花旗也考虑了各地住房市场之间的差异，以及参考了其他跟踪次级债的指数。
其实，去年底次按风暴越演越烈的时候，已经有投资者和监管部门开始调查投资银行以及对冲基金所持有资产的定价问题。
由于CDO交易比较少，所以缺乏可靠的市场价格资讯。“金融会计标准协会”(Financial Accounting Standard Board)要求必须以公平价格来计算出资产的“退出价格”(Exit Price)，而非“进入价格”(Enter Price)。“退出价格”是指出售资产的市场价格，而目前投行和对冲基金普遍使用其内部设计的数学公式推算的价格。
花旗财报深水炸弹 负资产按揭可能高达754亿美元 2008年01月24日 谭璐 查晓磊 香港报道
美联储在1月22日紧急减息75个基点之后，当天的美股低开后反弹。不过花旗继续跌势，收报24.40美元，下跌0.2%。1月15日公布第四季度业绩当天，花旗在纽交所的股价就应声下挫了7.3%，收报26.94美元，从近一年来最高点的55.55美元下跌了51.5%。
花旗上周的业绩报告显示，相关次按的拨备达181亿美元，使亏损达98.3亿美元，这两个数字使花旗成为次按危机中受伤最重的银行之一。上周花旗业绩报告出台之后，标准普尔将花旗的信贷评级降为AA-。不过，标准普尔的大中华区资深董事曾怡景对本报记者表示，花旗的股价与评级并没有直接关系，股价所反映的是市场对于这家银行的判断。
雷曼兄弟的高级副总裁兼全球首席经济学家Paul Sheard对本报记者表示，次按危机波及全球多个地区，估计美国经济衰退的几率大概有40%，不过他没有评论次按危机中银行业的损失情况。
一位摩根士丹利不愿意公开姓名的分析师表示，“花旗财报埋伏着很多炸弹，仅负资产按揭一项可能就相当严重。”
负资产按揭或高达754亿美元
在国内消费信贷方面，花旗产生了41亿美元的损失，主要包括6.9亿美元的高等级信贷净损失和33.1亿美元的净贷款损失准备。信贷损失的增加，主要包括一次住房按揭和二次住房按揭的违约率增长，以及未保护的个人贷款、信用卡和汽车贷款等方面的损失。
目前花旗的一次楼按和二次楼按的信贷规模一共2144亿美元。业绩报告上的LTV指标(loan to value ratio， 指楼按对楼宇价值的比率)显示花旗按揭有很大的比例已经暴露于风险之中，楼价下跌将对银行产生很大影响。香港的银行在贷款时LTV以70%为标准，而美国这方面的标准比较高。
根据花旗官方发布的业绩简报(Fourth Quarter 2007 Earnings Review)，在花旗的楼按组合中，一次楼按为共有1514亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按1074.94亿美元，占一次楼按的71%；LTV在80%-90%之间的136.26亿美元，占一次楼按的9%；而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按302.8亿美元，占花旗一次楼按的20%。
一次楼按29%的部分处于危险状态，即楼价下跌20%，这部分资产都会变成负资产按揭。高盛在1月15日发布的一份研究报告预计，美国楼价将由高峰至低点会跌20%至25%。按照这种估算，花旗持有的一次负资产按揭可能将在439.06亿美元以上。
花旗的报告也显示，其二次楼按共630亿美元，其中LTV小于80%的楼按315亿美元，占二次楼按的50%；LTV在80%-90%之间的100.8亿美元，占二次楼按的16%；而LTV等于或超过90%的楼按214.2亿美元，占二次楼按的34%，比例也相当高。按照高盛对于楼价未来走势的估计，花旗二次楼按变成负资产按揭的比例将超过50%，即至少有315亿美元二次楼按贷款规模超过抵押房屋的价值。
两项相加，一、二次楼按可能变为负资产按揭的规模高达754亿美元。
如果经济陷入衰退，随着消费者无力偿还信用卡和汽车贷款，花旗和其他银行可能需要计入更多亏损，为此，花旗在第四财季计提74亿美元潜在贷款损失准备金可能远远不足。
1月23日，投资银行雷曼兄弟高级副总裁兼亚太区首席经济学家苏博文接受本报采访时表示，上星期美国政府推出1500亿美元的救市措施，虽然这些措施出台得比较迟，不过相信行政手段刺激经济的成效将于今年第二季度开始显现，美国第二季度的GDP可能会因为救市措施而增加1%。
CDO资产得再冲减
花旗的巨额亏损主要受次贷损失和国内消费信贷两方面的影响。在次按风暴中出问题的，是把次按等资产打包而成的债务抵押债券(Collateralized debt obligation，CDO)，以及用CDO作抵押品发行的商业票据。花旗的业绩报告显示，拨备的181亿美元来自定息债券市场部门，包括143亿美元的高信用等级资产支持债券CDO，和29亿美元的借贷和结构性产品。
截至去年9月底，花旗有关CDO的数额是546亿美元，第四季减值181亿美元，比例达到33.2%，因此到2007年底，花旗的CDO规模降为373亿美元。不过，美国Tavakoli Structured Finance Inc的总裁Janet Tavakoli表示，花旗可能需要再减值33亿美元。Janet Tavakoli认为CDO的市场价格比较低，花旗的资产冲减并没有完全反映当前的市场价格。如果用市场价格来计算，花旗的冲减总额应达到210亿美元左右。
花旗的首席财务官Gary Crittenden在回应上述指责时说，花旗已经进行了“认为适当的冲减”。花旗使用了各种模型来对债券进行估价。花旗也考虑了各地住房市场之间的差异，以及参考了其他跟踪次级债的指数。
其实，去年底次按风暴越演越烈的时候，已经有投资者和监管部门开始调查投资银行以及对冲基金所持有资产的定价问题。
由于CDO交易比较少，所以缺乏可靠的市场价格资讯。“金融会计标准协会”(Financial Accounting Standard Board)要求必须以公平价格来计算出资产的“退出价格”(Exit Price)，而非“进入价格”(Enter Price)。“退出价格”是指出售资产的市场价格，而目前投行和对冲基金普遍使用其内部设计的数学公式推算的价格。
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