感情化描述历史 == 带着主观动机去远离客观事实
感情化描述特殊年代的国际贸易，不是有思想有理智的行为。
缺乏独立思考精神，这算是最大的洗脑后遗症了吧。
找到两篇专业文章， 有兴趣可以了解下。
1. Donaghy, Greg, and Michael D. Stevenson. “The Limits of Alliance: Cold War Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950-1963.” Agricultural History, vol. 83, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29–50. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20454911.
Abstract
Although Canada was a committed member of the western alliance and publically supported Washington, DC's efforts to isolate communist China, Ottawa embarked on large-scale wheat sales to Beijing in the late 1950s in the face of sustained US opposition. Drawing on a broad range of archival records, this paper explores the three main factors that encouraged the Canadian government in this course: growing doubts about the wisdom of isolating communist China; mounting anger at Washington, DC's use of subsidized wheat sales to capture traditional Canadian markets; and a surging sense of Canadian nationalism that sought a distinct role for Canada on the world stage. Clearly, as was so often the case in postwar Canadian foreign economic policy, a narrowly defined national interest easily trumped the ideological pressures of western solidarity.
2. Kristjanson, R. L. “Problems and Prospects of Canadian Wheat Sales to China and the USSR.” Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 49, no. 5, 1967, pp. 1345–1351. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1237025.
节选：
... sales to China haven been for 25-percent cash at time of shipment, with the balance, plus interest in 18 months. The Chinese have never defaulted on any of their commitments and have indeed actually made prepayments-presumably as and when their financial position has allowed them to do so.
感情化描述特殊年代的国际贸易，不是有思想有理智的行为。
缺乏独立思考精神，这算是最大的洗脑后遗症了吧。
找到两篇专业文章， 有兴趣可以了解下。
1. Donaghy, Greg, and Michael D. Stevenson. “The Limits of Alliance: Cold War Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950-1963.” Agricultural History, vol. 83, no. 1, 2009, pp. 29–50. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20454911.
Abstract
Although Canada was a committed member of the western alliance and publically supported Washington, DC's efforts to isolate communist China, Ottawa embarked on large-scale wheat sales to Beijing in the late 1950s in the face of sustained US opposition. Drawing on a broad range of archival records, this paper explores the three main factors that encouraged the Canadian government in this course: growing doubts about the wisdom of isolating communist China; mounting anger at Washington, DC's use of subsidized wheat sales to capture traditional Canadian markets; and a surging sense of Canadian nationalism that sought a distinct role for Canada on the world stage. Clearly, as was so often the case in postwar Canadian foreign economic policy, a narrowly defined national interest easily trumped the ideological pressures of western solidarity.
2. Kristjanson, R. L. “Problems and Prospects of Canadian Wheat Sales to China and the USSR.” Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 49, no. 5, 1967, pp. 1345–1351. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1237025.
节选：
... sales to China haven been for 25-percent cash at time of shipment, with the balance, plus interest in 18 months. The Chinese have never defaulted on any of their commitments and have indeed actually made prepayments-presumably as and when their financial position has allowed them to do so.
最后编辑: 2019-01-27
