- 主题发起人 Easyhao
- 发布时间 2016-10-14
主要是车主是个有点钱的，法官总要找到点补偿给伤害大的，这个是美国和加拿大的法律常态。
加拿大真好，保护罪犯的身体安全，天堂的法律就是好，加拿大罪犯都了开了花了
[Strathy C.J.O, Brown and Huscroft JJ.A.]
Counsel:
D. S. Young and K. R. Bridel, for the appellant, James Chadwick Ranki
M. L. Bent, J.T. Akbarali, and A. E. Campos Reales, for the respondent
J. Chapman, for the respondent, C.C. (Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund)
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Duty of Care, Reasonable Forseeability, Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.), Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79
Facts: J.J., a 15 year old boy, met with his friends C.C., age 16, and T.T., age 16. C.C. and T.T. drank numerous beers. All three boys also drank vodka mixed with orange juice and shared a single marijuana cigarette. T.T. went home later that evening and C.C. and J.J. left the house at that time.
C.C. and J.J. walked around with the intention of stealing from unlocked cars. They attempted to break into several cars and found that a few of them were unlocked. They ended up at Rankin’s Garage & Sales (“Rankin’s Garage”), which services and sells cars and trucks. The garage property was not secured. C.C. testified that he remembered checking two cars on the lot and finding an unlocked Toyota Camry parked in an area behind the garage. The keys to the Camry were in the ashtray. C.C. decided to steal the car even though he did not have a driver’s license and had never driven a car.
J.J. got into the car as passenger. C.C. decided to drive to the nearby town of Walkerton to pick up a friend. The car crashed on the way there. J.J. suffered a catastrophic brain injury.
J.J. sued C.C., Rankin’s Garage, and C.C.’s mother, D.C., for negligence. J.J. conceded, through his parents, that he was partially responsible for his injuries.
The trial judge instructed the jury that Rankin’s Garage owed J.J. a duty of care, among other things “because people who [are] entrusted with the possession of motor vehicles must assure themselves that the youth in their community are not able to take possession of such dangerous objects.”
A jury found the Rankin’s Garage partly liable for injuries suffered by J.J.. The jury also found C.C. and D.C. liable, and J.J. contributorily negligent. The sole proprietor of Rankin’s Garage appeals the jury’s decision that he owed a duty of care to J.J..
Issues:
Reasoning:
(a) Has a duty already been recognized in prior cases?
No. The trial judge incorrectly concluded that prior cases have already recognized this duty of care. The trial judge relied on cases where a third party who was unconnected to the theft was injured. These cases are not analogous to the circumstances of this case. In fact, the finding that a duty of care is owed to a third party is relatively rare in cases arising out of the theft of a vehicle because the injury to the third party was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the theft. Therefore, this is a novel situation and a full Anns-Cooper analysis is required.
(b) The Anns-Cooper Test
The Anns-Cooper Test is satisfied and a duty of care exists. Though the trial judge only dealt with the Anns-Cooper test briefly, her conclusion was correct: the requirements of foreseeability and proximity are established on the facts of this case, and the duty is not negated by residual policy concerns.
(i) Foreseeability
There was ample evidence to support the conclusion of foreseeability in this case. In particular, Rankin’s Garage was easily accessible and it had no security measures designed to keep people off the property when the business was not open. Cars were left unlocked with the keys in them. Further, there was a history of theft in the area. Therefore, the risk of theft was clear.
(ii) Proximity
Proximity is established. Proximity does not depend on whether the appellant knew J.J., but on whether the appellant should have had minors like J.J. in mind when he considered security measures at Rankin’s Garage. In this case, the appellant had care and control of many vehicles for commercial purposes. With that role comes the responsibility of securing the vehicles against minors, in whose hands the vehicles are potentially dangerous. He should have adverted to the risk that minors would be tempted to take a vehicle if it were made easily available to them. Further, securing the vehicles was not an onerous obligation. It was a simple matter of locking the vehicles and storing the keys.
(iii) Residual Policy concerns
No residual policy concerns exist that negate the prima facie duty of care. The law does not currently provide a remedy in this case. Further, recognition of a duty of care in this case would not create a spectre of unlimited liability to an unlimited class of claimants or result in undue hardship to the appellant. The duty can be complied with simply by locking the vehicles and securing the keys. Lastly, the duty of care operates independently of the illegal or immoral conduct of an injured party. Their wrongdoing is properly taken into account in determining contributory negligence, as occurred in this case.
(2) Yes. The trial judge correctly charged the jury that the appellant owed an enhanced duty to J.J.. Though J.J. was engaging in adult activities – such as drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, stealing, driving without a license, and driving while impaired – the case is not concerned with the duty of care owed by minors who participate in adult activities. The case is concerned with the duty of care owed by adults to minors
(3) No. The trial judge did not err in admitting evidence from C.C.’s sister, C.L.C., as to a previous theft from Rankin’s Garage, and from Officer Pittman concerning the establishment of a theft-prevention program. This evidence spoke to the history of theft in the area. As such, the evidence was clearly relevant to the question of foreseeability and no prejudice was caused by its admission.
(4) No. The jury verdict is sustainable. The court requires an appellant to meet a high threshold to overturn a jury verdict. The decision must be “so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to satisfy the Court that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it”. A jury’s decision concerning the apportionment of liability is entitled to the same deference.The appellant failed to meet this high threshold. Though there is room for reasonable disagreement in the apportionment of liability, it cannot be said that the jury’s decision is “so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to satisfy the Court that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it”.
Counsel:
D. S. Young and K. R. Bridel, for the appellant, James Chadwick Ranki
M. L. Bent, J.T. Akbarali, and A. E. Campos Reales, for the respondent
J. Chapman, for the respondent, C.C. (Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund)
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Duty of Care, Reasonable Forseeability, Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.), Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79
Facts: J.J., a 15 year old boy, met with his friends C.C., age 16, and T.T., age 16. C.C. and T.T. drank numerous beers. All three boys also drank vodka mixed with orange juice and shared a single marijuana cigarette. T.T. went home later that evening and C.C. and J.J. left the house at that time.
C.C. and J.J. walked around with the intention of stealing from unlocked cars. They attempted to break into several cars and found that a few of them were unlocked. They ended up at Rankin’s Garage & Sales (“Rankin’s Garage”), which services and sells cars and trucks. The garage property was not secured. C.C. testified that he remembered checking two cars on the lot and finding an unlocked Toyota Camry parked in an area behind the garage. The keys to the Camry were in the ashtray. C.C. decided to steal the car even though he did not have a driver’s license and had never driven a car.
J.J. got into the car as passenger. C.C. decided to drive to the nearby town of Walkerton to pick up a friend. The car crashed on the way there. J.J. suffered a catastrophic brain injury.
J.J. sued C.C., Rankin’s Garage, and C.C.’s mother, D.C., for negligence. J.J. conceded, through his parents, that he was partially responsible for his injuries.
The trial judge instructed the jury that Rankin’s Garage owed J.J. a duty of care, among other things “because people who [are] entrusted with the possession of motor vehicles must assure themselves that the youth in their community are not able to take possession of such dangerous objects.”
A jury found the Rankin’s Garage partly liable for injuries suffered by J.J.. The jury also found C.C. and D.C. liable, and J.J. contributorily negligent. The sole proprietor of Rankin’s Garage appeals the jury’s decision that he owed a duty of care to J.J..
Issues:
- Did the trial judge err in concluding that Rankin’s Garage owed a duty of care to J.J.?
- Did the trial judge correctly charge the jury regarding an enhanced duty owed to J.J.?
- Did the trial judge err in admitting irrelevant evidence that was highly prejudicial to Rankin’s Garage and of little probative value?
- Is the verdict of the jury unsustainable given all of the evidence and findings, including that C.C. and J.J. both participated in the theft of the vehicle?
Reasoning:
- No. The trial judge was correct, though for different reasons, to conclude that Rankin’s Garage owed a duty of care to J.J. Courts determine whether a duty of care arises in particular circumstances based on the decision of the House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.), as modified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79.
(a) Has a duty already been recognized in prior cases?
No. The trial judge incorrectly concluded that prior cases have already recognized this duty of care. The trial judge relied on cases where a third party who was unconnected to the theft was injured. These cases are not analogous to the circumstances of this case. In fact, the finding that a duty of care is owed to a third party is relatively rare in cases arising out of the theft of a vehicle because the injury to the third party was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the theft. Therefore, this is a novel situation and a full Anns-Cooper analysis is required.
(b) The Anns-Cooper Test
The Anns-Cooper Test is satisfied and a duty of care exists. Though the trial judge only dealt with the Anns-Cooper test briefly, her conclusion was correct: the requirements of foreseeability and proximity are established on the facts of this case, and the duty is not negated by residual policy concerns.
(i) Foreseeability
There was ample evidence to support the conclusion of foreseeability in this case. In particular, Rankin’s Garage was easily accessible and it had no security measures designed to keep people off the property when the business was not open. Cars were left unlocked with the keys in them. Further, there was a history of theft in the area. Therefore, the risk of theft was clear.
(ii) Proximity
Proximity is established. Proximity does not depend on whether the appellant knew J.J., but on whether the appellant should have had minors like J.J. in mind when he considered security measures at Rankin’s Garage. In this case, the appellant had care and control of many vehicles for commercial purposes. With that role comes the responsibility of securing the vehicles against minors, in whose hands the vehicles are potentially dangerous. He should have adverted to the risk that minors would be tempted to take a vehicle if it were made easily available to them. Further, securing the vehicles was not an onerous obligation. It was a simple matter of locking the vehicles and storing the keys.
(iii) Residual Policy concerns
No residual policy concerns exist that negate the prima facie duty of care. The law does not currently provide a remedy in this case. Further, recognition of a duty of care in this case would not create a spectre of unlimited liability to an unlimited class of claimants or result in undue hardship to the appellant. The duty can be complied with simply by locking the vehicles and securing the keys. Lastly, the duty of care operates independently of the illegal or immoral conduct of an injured party. Their wrongdoing is properly taken into account in determining contributory negligence, as occurred in this case.
(2) Yes. The trial judge correctly charged the jury that the appellant owed an enhanced duty to J.J.. Though J.J. was engaging in adult activities – such as drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, stealing, driving without a license, and driving while impaired – the case is not concerned with the duty of care owed by minors who participate in adult activities. The case is concerned with the duty of care owed by adults to minors
(3) No. The trial judge did not err in admitting evidence from C.C.’s sister, C.L.C., as to a previous theft from Rankin’s Garage, and from Officer Pittman concerning the establishment of a theft-prevention program. This evidence spoke to the history of theft in the area. As such, the evidence was clearly relevant to the question of foreseeability and no prejudice was caused by its admission.
(4) No. The jury verdict is sustainable. The court requires an appellant to meet a high threshold to overturn a jury verdict. The decision must be “so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to satisfy the Court that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it”. A jury’s decision concerning the apportionment of liability is entitled to the same deference.The appellant failed to meet this high threshold. Though there is room for reasonable disagreement in the apportionment of liability, it cannot be said that the jury’s decision is “so plainly unreasonable and unjust as to satisfy the Court that no jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it”.
虽然判决有点可笑，但支持惩罚过分放松保护自己的汽车的做法。因为汽车是交通工具，但转眼也会变成杀人凶器，车主有责任保护自己的车，如果很简单的被偷了，而犯人有利用汽车刑事犯罪，那么车主也要承担一定的责任。
我是一把钥匙启动后用另一把通过锁孔机械锁门。
