- 主题发起人 martinqz
- 发布时间 2014-05-05
Last updated: August 23, 2015 8:26 pm
The Fed looks set to make a dangerous mistake
Lawrence Summers
Raising rates this year will threaten all of the central bank’s major objectives
Will the Federal Reserve’s September meeting see US interest rates go up for the first time since 2006? Officials have held out the prospect that it might, and have suggested that — barring major unforeseen developments — rates will probably be increased by the end of the year. Conditions could change, and the Fed has been careful to avoid outright commitments. But a reasonable assessment of current conditions suggest that raising rates in the near future would be a serious error that would threaten all three of the Fed’s major objectives — price stability, full employment and financial stability.
Like most major central banks the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice by adopting a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this — a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy. More than half the components of the consumer price index have declined in the past six months — the first time this has happened in more than a decade. CPI inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices and difficult-to-measure housing, is less than 1 per cent. Market-based measures of expectations suggest that, over the next 10 years, inflation will be well under 2 per cent. If the currencies of China and other emerging markets depreciate further, US inflation will be even more subdued.
Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels because higher interest rates make holding on to cash more attractive than investing it. Higher interest rates will also increase the value of the dollar, making US producers less competitive and pressuring the economies of our trading partners.
This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality. Studies of periods of tight labour markets like the late 1990s and 1960s make it clear that the best social programme for disadvantaged workers is an economy where employers are struggling to fill vacancies.
There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago, as low interest rates were encouraging investors to take more risks and businesses to borrow money and engage in financial engineering. At the time, I believed that the economic costs of a rate increase exceeded the financial stability benefits, but there were grounds for concern. That debate is now moot. With credit becoming more expensive, the outlook for the Chinese economy clouded at best, emerging markets submerging, the US stock market in a correction, widespread concerns about liquidity, and expected volatility having increased at a near-record rate, markets are themselves dampening any euphoria or overconfidence. The Fed does not have to do the job. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping some part of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.
Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates were now 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from a sense that the economy has substantially normalised during six years of recovery, and so the extraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn. There has been much talk of “headwinds” that require low interest rates now but this will abate before long, allowing for normal growth and normal interest rates.
Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach the seventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think of economic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds. Fiscal drag is over. Banks are well capitalised. Corporations are flush with cash. Household balance sheets are substantially repaired.
Much more plausible is the view that, for reasons rooted in technological and demographic change and reinforced by greater regulation of the financial sector, the global economy has difficulty generating demand for all that can be produced. This is the “secular stagnation” diagnosis, or the very similar idea that Ben Bernanke, former Fed chairman, has urged of a “savings glut”. Satisfactory growth, if it can be achieved, requires very low interest rates that historically we have only seen during economic crises. This is why long term bond markets are telling us that real interest rates are expected to be close to zero in the industrialised world over the next decade.
New conditions require new policies. There is much that should be done, such as steps to promote public and private investment so as to raise the level of real interest rates consistent with full employment. Unless these new policies are implemented, inflation sharply accelerates, or euphoria in markets breaks out, there is no case for the Fed to adjust policy interest rates.
The writer is the Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary
The Fed looks set to make a dangerous mistake
Lawrence Summers
Raising rates this year will threaten all of the central bank’s major objectives
Will the Federal Reserve’s September meeting see US interest rates go up for the first time since 2006? Officials have held out the prospect that it might, and have suggested that — barring major unforeseen developments — rates will probably be increased by the end of the year. Conditions could change, and the Fed has been careful to avoid outright commitments. But a reasonable assessment of current conditions suggest that raising rates in the near future would be a serious error that would threaten all three of the Fed’s major objectives — price stability, full employment and financial stability.
Like most major central banks the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice by adopting a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this — a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy. More than half the components of the consumer price index have declined in the past six months — the first time this has happened in more than a decade. CPI inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices and difficult-to-measure housing, is less than 1 per cent. Market-based measures of expectations suggest that, over the next 10 years, inflation will be well under 2 per cent. If the currencies of China and other emerging markets depreciate further, US inflation will be even more subdued.
Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels because higher interest rates make holding on to cash more attractive than investing it. Higher interest rates will also increase the value of the dollar, making US producers less competitive and pressuring the economies of our trading partners.
This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality. Studies of periods of tight labour markets like the late 1990s and 1960s make it clear that the best social programme for disadvantaged workers is an economy where employers are struggling to fill vacancies.
There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago, as low interest rates were encouraging investors to take more risks and businesses to borrow money and engage in financial engineering. At the time, I believed that the economic costs of a rate increase exceeded the financial stability benefits, but there were grounds for concern. That debate is now moot. With credit becoming more expensive, the outlook for the Chinese economy clouded at best, emerging markets submerging, the US stock market in a correction, widespread concerns about liquidity, and expected volatility having increased at a near-record rate, markets are themselves dampening any euphoria or overconfidence. The Fed does not have to do the job. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping some part of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.
Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates were now 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from a sense that the economy has substantially normalised during six years of recovery, and so the extraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn. There has been much talk of “headwinds” that require low interest rates now but this will abate before long, allowing for normal growth and normal interest rates.
Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach the seventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think of economic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds. Fiscal drag is over. Banks are well capitalised. Corporations are flush with cash. Household balance sheets are substantially repaired.
Much more plausible is the view that, for reasons rooted in technological and demographic change and reinforced by greater regulation of the financial sector, the global economy has difficulty generating demand for all that can be produced. This is the “secular stagnation” diagnosis, or the very similar idea that Ben Bernanke, former Fed chairman, has urged of a “savings glut”. Satisfactory growth, if it can be achieved, requires very low interest rates that historically we have only seen during economic crises. This is why long term bond markets are telling us that real interest rates are expected to be close to zero in the industrialised world over the next decade.
New conditions require new policies. There is much that should be done, such as steps to promote public and private investment so as to raise the level of real interest rates consistent with full employment. Unless these new policies are implemented, inflation sharply accelerates, or euphoria in markets breaks out, there is no case for the Fed to adjust policy interest rates.
The writer is the Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary
危险的游戏：负利率政策
文 / 程俊 2015年09月26日 19:07:00 1
美联储在加息问题上长时间的“只做不说”令市场逐渐意识到，过去数年全球央行所奉行的零利率政策并未能取得实质性进展。在QE效应递减的当下，负利率似乎将成为央行们下一个拿出手的武器。然而，这一政策的副作用可能远超预期。
英格兰央行首席经济学家Andrew Haldane在北爱尔兰的“利率还能有多低”演讲中尽管没有明言零利率政策已经彻底失败，但是其对该政策未能完成经济复苏愿景的失望还是难以掩饰。这似乎已经承认，央行们接受了零利率政策失败的现实。
环顾四周，即便是看起来还不错的英国、德国还是美国，他们仅有的复苏迹象是否完全依赖于利率政策还不得而知，而当外生性因素出现威胁发达经济体复苏的时候(比如中国经济下滑和新兴市场危机)，却很少有人去去关注，此前的政策是否正确或者已经破产。
在全球经济联动性如此高的背景下，发达国家相对稳定的经济似乎也正在面临动摇。此前一轮经济危机已经迫使主要央行用尽了传统的利率政策，零利率边界之下，央行们似乎只有两个选择：继续扩大QE或者负利率政策。
尽管按照经济学原理，负利率违背常理，迫使人们面临持币即贬值的窘境，但是对于央行而言，即便意识到这些问题，他们可能也别无选择。按照Haldane的想法，央行可以使用各种方法努力将实际利率水平控制在负值。
和零利率政策一样，负利率的初衷也是刺激通胀回升至正常水平。然而和零利率不同的是，负利率的杀伤力更为明显。可以预见的是，在通胀回升之前，利率势必将长期在负值水平徘徊，并且任何持有现金的人都无法逃避。这也是为什么英格兰央行对区块链技术感兴趣的原因之一——政府如果发行数字现金(类似比特币)，那么公众就不可能找到其他方式来对抗负利率。
对于负利率的副作用或者问题，Haldane的发言并没有涉及太多。但是显而易见的是，储户在银行存钱还需要缴纳费用看起来和征收“现金税”并没有太多的区别。而在实际环境为通缩的情况下，负利率的影响会更为直观——民众会很轻易的意识到货币贬值的程度。这样普通人和央行之间的矛盾就直接浮出了水面。
随后所有人都会明白一个道理，货币(纸币)将越来不值钱。这不仅有可能引发恶性的通胀，而且也将令货币的存在价值失去意义。在极端情况下，如果所有人都不愿意持有货币，那么货币就完全没有了意义，这就和其他所有商品一样。
如今，已经有数个央行开始了负利率政策，还有一些更为关键的经济体还没有走出这一步。在GoldMoney基金会的研究主管Alasdair Macleod看来，一旦所有的央行都开启负利率的大门，那么法定货币告别历史舞台可能也不会太久远了。
文 / 程俊 2015年09月26日 19:07:00 1
美联储在加息问题上长时间的“只做不说”令市场逐渐意识到，过去数年全球央行所奉行的零利率政策并未能取得实质性进展。在QE效应递减的当下，负利率似乎将成为央行们下一个拿出手的武器。然而，这一政策的副作用可能远超预期。
英格兰央行首席经济学家Andrew Haldane在北爱尔兰的“利率还能有多低”演讲中尽管没有明言零利率政策已经彻底失败，但是其对该政策未能完成经济复苏愿景的失望还是难以掩饰。这似乎已经承认，央行们接受了零利率政策失败的现实。
环顾四周，即便是看起来还不错的英国、德国还是美国，他们仅有的复苏迹象是否完全依赖于利率政策还不得而知，而当外生性因素出现威胁发达经济体复苏的时候(比如中国经济下滑和新兴市场危机)，却很少有人去去关注，此前的政策是否正确或者已经破产。
在全球经济联动性如此高的背景下，发达国家相对稳定的经济似乎也正在面临动摇。此前一轮经济危机已经迫使主要央行用尽了传统的利率政策，零利率边界之下，央行们似乎只有两个选择：继续扩大QE或者负利率政策。
尽管按照经济学原理，负利率违背常理，迫使人们面临持币即贬值的窘境，但是对于央行而言，即便意识到这些问题，他们可能也别无选择。按照Haldane的想法，央行可以使用各种方法努力将实际利率水平控制在负值。
和零利率政策一样，负利率的初衷也是刺激通胀回升至正常水平。然而和零利率不同的是，负利率的杀伤力更为明显。可以预见的是，在通胀回升之前，利率势必将长期在负值水平徘徊，并且任何持有现金的人都无法逃避。这也是为什么英格兰央行对区块链技术感兴趣的原因之一——政府如果发行数字现金(类似比特币)，那么公众就不可能找到其他方式来对抗负利率。
对于负利率的副作用或者问题，Haldane的发言并没有涉及太多。但是显而易见的是，储户在银行存钱还需要缴纳费用看起来和征收“现金税”并没有太多的区别。而在实际环境为通缩的情况下，负利率的影响会更为直观——民众会很轻易的意识到货币贬值的程度。这样普通人和央行之间的矛盾就直接浮出了水面。
随后所有人都会明白一个道理，货币(纸币)将越来不值钱。这不仅有可能引发恶性的通胀，而且也将令货币的存在价值失去意义。在极端情况下，如果所有人都不愿意持有货币，那么货币就完全没有了意义，这就和其他所有商品一样。
如今，已经有数个央行开始了负利率政策，还有一些更为关键的经济体还没有走出这一步。在GoldMoney基金会的研究主管Alasdair Macleod看来，一旦所有的央行都开启负利率的大门，那么法定货币告别历史舞台可能也不会太久远了。
马老师安好。请教一事，由于近半年的全球股市风云变化，我现在在很认真的考虑加拿大的分红保险。孩子买入一份，基础保额50万的分红险，全部保费也就十三万多，数额不多，我也就轻易做了决定。加拿大的保险法不允许趸付， 我是用20年期限的年金形式一次支付，每年从年金账户划入孩子的保险账户支付保费。
现在关于自己的那份，由于年纪较大，保费比较昂贵，正在纠结中。但是自己投资，的确是信心全无。你怎么认为?
现在关于自己的那份，由于年纪较大，保费比较昂贵，正在纠结中。但是自己投资，的确是信心全无。你怎么认为?
最后编辑: 2015-10-04
马老师有个宏观的问题想请教你，目前环太国家的tpp会导致中国使用货币贬值当武器来瓦解吗？感觉目前中国有两个反制措施，一个是单独与tpp国家签订自贸协定各个击破逐渐瓦解tpp，另一个更猛的招就是人民币贬值增加出口。但是感觉第二招也会招致报复算是七伤拳吧。。。
有。保险公司的年金账户，利息随着目前整个贷款利率的低迷，20年期限的年金现在大概是2.5%的年利息。所以我一次付清到年金账户，大致相当于打7.5折。比如原本20年缴纳15万保费，我现在就放入年金账户15*0.75=11.25万。这样就相当于所有保费付完了。
去年20年期限的年金还有4%的利息，今年完全不行了，经济低迷，各种收益都很低。GIC就别提了，现在一年期的大概1%。
目前加拿大股市这么差，我的加元股票基金，无一幸免，我没法自己投资了。要是以前收益好的时候，我是根本看不上分红险的。
50w是基础赔付额，随着盈利积累而增加。这终究是一份保单，同时有投资盈利进账，分红保险是所有的保险产品中最贵的一种。
多年之后自己也可取钱出来用（免税方式是抵押保给银行借钱出来、或者直接从保单现金值中取钱）。
但这个产品流动性差，因为一旦钱进入这个产品，基本就是20年之后才可动用了。但是产品很稳健，这是吸引我的地方。保险公司的投资中，股票类才占15%左右。你看看宏利保险的这个产品，和其他保险公司，大同小异。
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见过几十年前买分红险的，销售说只要**年，以后分红就可以充当保费了，结果几十年过去了，还要自己交钱，纯粹忽悠！
未来十年挑战很多，留多点钱保命要紧，钱进保险公司，支配权不归你，过一阵，忽然发现手头缺钱了。
未来五年机会很多，都是50%-100%的回报，为啥对投资没有信心了？
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