也谈钓鱼岛
- 主题发起人 livingsky
- 发布时间 2013-03-02
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
不远万里到了加拿大，还在惦记着钓鱼岛，这伟大的爱故国感情，值得每一味中国人学习。
不远万里到了加拿大，还在惦记着钓鱼岛，这伟大的爱故国感情，值得每一味中国人学习。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephen...ory-blundering-into-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis/
楼主赶快想法求得大家的原谅，可能还来得及。
Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis
Former students of Asian politics and international relations of a certain age (my age, or a bit older), would in college or graduate school have heard of, if not
English: President Barack Obama talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao during the morning plenary session of the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit at the David L. Lawrence Convention Center in Pittsburgh. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
carefully read, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, by Allen S. Whiting (1960). This was a seminal study of formal or–mainly–informal signals sent by China in 1950 warning with increasing clarity and vehemence the officially U.N. (but overwhelmingly U.S.) forces under command of Douglas MacArthur, then beating back North Korea invaders and advancing up the Korea peninsula, that China was prepared to and would intervene on behalf of North Korea if its territory or vital interests were threatened.
In the event, on October 25,1950, 25 days after U.N. forces had crossed the 38th parallel, 200,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (redesignated by Mao Zedong the People’s Volunteer Army) soldiers, having secretly crossed the Yalu River on October 19, attacked U.N. forces, beginning an engagement that would vastly increase casualties on both sides, but especially for the PLA. Whiting’s book sought to discern at what point China’s in many cases subtle and indirect warnings might have been heeded or responded so that intervention might have been avoided.
I have been reminded of China Crosses the Yalu as I have worked through the new book on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island crisis by Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, one of Japan’s most eminent China scholars. The book (written in Japanese) is entitled:「尖閣問題の核心 」(The Core of the Senkaku Issue), and bears a subtitle:「日中関係はどうなる」 (What is to Become of Japan-China Relations). I believe that the book is the fairest and most objective, as well as the most thorough, exposition of the positions of both Japan and China, and–critically–the U.S., on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.
At the risk of oversimplifying, I think I can summarize Professor Yabuki’s analysis and conclusions as follows:
1,The Japanese position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is indefensible on several counts, including most fundamentally Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (which required the return of all territories “stolen” from China).
2,The Meiji government’s annexation of the Ryuku Islands (theretofore an autonomous kingdom) in January 1885, within which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were identified, followed three months later by the Qing Dynasty’s surrender of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (ending the Sino-Japanese War) are both mooted by the terms of Potsdam. The islands were and are clearly part of Taiwan, which in addition has the most legitimate claim to continuous use/occupation.
3,The Japanese position that Senkaku/Diaoyu is part of Japanese territory because it was awarded to Japan by the U.S. in the Okinawa Reversion agreement of 1971 is similarly contrary to fact. The U.S. awarded to Japan only administrative authority over the islands, not sovereignty. Sovereignty was specifically not transferred. The U.S. continued to maintain was undetermined between the three claimants and would only be determined through discussion and agreement. (As I noted in the last post, the Obama administration–in a monumental blunder–effectively changed this policy by failing to object to and stop Japanese “nationalization.”)
4,Japanese policy–and particularly public misunderstanding–has been based on the false assertion, uttered by then foreign minister Fukuda Takeo in testimony to the Upper House of Diet on December 15, 1971 that Okinawa Reversion had accomplished the restoration of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Whether Fukuda misunderstood the issue, or intended to deliberately deceive the country through this testimony is unclear.
5,The Chinese position on handling the territorial issue was, before Japanese “nationalization,” grounded on the 1972 agreement between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue-Premier Zhou Enlai, when the terms of Japan-China diplomatic relations were determined, to “shelve” the issue–i.e., to avoid any acts that sought to enforce one side’s claim to sovereignty.
6,Yabuki cites his own research and authoritative third party sources to charge that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed from official transcripts of the Tanaka-Zhou discussions that agreement to “shelve” the issue, allowing future Japanese governments to fraudulently claim that the issue was not discussed and that China asserted a claim over the islands.
7,Under the circumstances above, the decision of the Noda government to “nationalize” the islands was a grave provocation, a fundamental change in the status quo, tantamount from the Chinese point of view to aggression and forceful annexation of Chinese territory. An equivalently forceful Chinese response to “balance” the level of its sovereign claim was inevitable.
What has reminded me of Whiting’s study are the many signals sent by China since the beginning of the current crisis (which might be traced back to the fishing boat incidence in 2010). In December 2011 I posted on the humiliation meted out to PM Noda during a short, seemingly purposeless–and certainly fruitless–trip made to Beijing. Already, Japan-China relations had cooled to near freezing.
Professor Yabuki chronicles the many signals of trouble as Chinese concern over the direction of Japanese policy grew. These included the refusal of Hu Jintao in February in to meet a top level delegation of seven of Japan organizations’ heads in Beijing to commemorate the 40th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic relations. The last minute cancellations of a scheduled visit to Hu Deping, son of Japan’s last “sympathizer” in the Beijing leadership, Hu Yaobang, and a visit of China’s most senior uniformed military officer, Guo Boxiong, in May.
What concerns Yabuki most is that these signals, among many others, were hardly noticed or appreciated in Japan. Yet, they were leading to what became almost a complete breakdown in communications with China. The almost farcical, but deeply tragic, denouement of this breakdown was the “16 minute standing dialogue” between Hu Jintao and Noda held on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Vladivostok on September 9 at which each side delivered its ultimatum.
The Noda Cabinet decided the next day to implement nationalization and the following day paid the money and signed documentation. It is now very hard to believe that anyone expected Japan’s decision to have the effect of de-escalating the crisis. If anyone did they were making the same mistakes as Truman and MacArthur in 1950.
Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephen...ory-blundering-into-the-senkakudiaoyu-crisis/
楼主赶快想法求得大家的原谅，可能还来得及。
Japan and U.S. Ignored Chinese Signals and History, Blundering into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis
Former students of Asian politics and international relations of a certain age (my age, or a bit older), would in college or graduate school have heard of, if not
English: President Barack Obama talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao during the morning plenary session of the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit at the David L. Lawrence Convention Center in Pittsburgh. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
carefully read, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, by Allen S. Whiting (1960). This was a seminal study of formal or–mainly–informal signals sent by China in 1950 warning with increasing clarity and vehemence the officially U.N. (but overwhelmingly U.S.) forces under command of Douglas MacArthur, then beating back North Korea invaders and advancing up the Korea peninsula, that China was prepared to and would intervene on behalf of North Korea if its territory or vital interests were threatened.
In the event, on October 25,1950, 25 days after U.N. forces had crossed the 38th parallel, 200,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (redesignated by Mao Zedong the People’s Volunteer Army) soldiers, having secretly crossed the Yalu River on October 19, attacked U.N. forces, beginning an engagement that would vastly increase casualties on both sides, but especially for the PLA. Whiting’s book sought to discern at what point China’s in many cases subtle and indirect warnings might have been heeded or responded so that intervention might have been avoided.
I have been reminded of China Crosses the Yalu as I have worked through the new book on the Senkaku/Diaoyu island crisis by Yabuki Susumu (矢吹晋), professor emeritus of Yokohama City University, one of Japan’s most eminent China scholars. The book (written in Japanese) is entitled:「尖閣問題の核心 」(The Core of the Senkaku Issue), and bears a subtitle:「日中関係はどうなる」 (What is to Become of Japan-China Relations). I believe that the book is the fairest and most objective, as well as the most thorough, exposition of the positions of both Japan and China, and–critically–the U.S., on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.
At the risk of oversimplifying, I think I can summarize Professor Yabuki’s analysis and conclusions as follows:
1,The Japanese position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is indefensible on several counts, including most fundamentally Japan’s unconditional acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration (which required the return of all territories “stolen” from China).
2,The Meiji government’s annexation of the Ryuku Islands (theretofore an autonomous kingdom) in January 1885, within which the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were identified, followed three months later by the Qing Dynasty’s surrender of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki (ending the Sino-Japanese War) are both mooted by the terms of Potsdam. The islands were and are clearly part of Taiwan, which in addition has the most legitimate claim to continuous use/occupation.
3,The Japanese position that Senkaku/Diaoyu is part of Japanese territory because it was awarded to Japan by the U.S. in the Okinawa Reversion agreement of 1971 is similarly contrary to fact. The U.S. awarded to Japan only administrative authority over the islands, not sovereignty. Sovereignty was specifically not transferred. The U.S. continued to maintain was undetermined between the three claimants and would only be determined through discussion and agreement. (As I noted in the last post, the Obama administration–in a monumental blunder–effectively changed this policy by failing to object to and stop Japanese “nationalization.”)
4,Japanese policy–and particularly public misunderstanding–has been based on the false assertion, uttered by then foreign minister Fukuda Takeo in testimony to the Upper House of Diet on December 15, 1971 that Okinawa Reversion had accomplished the restoration of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Whether Fukuda misunderstood the issue, or intended to deliberately deceive the country through this testimony is unclear.
5,The Chinese position on handling the territorial issue was, before Japanese “nationalization,” grounded on the 1972 agreement between Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue-Premier Zhou Enlai, when the terms of Japan-China diplomatic relations were determined, to “shelve” the issue–i.e., to avoid any acts that sought to enforce one side’s claim to sovereignty.
6,Yabuki cites his own research and authoritative third party sources to charge that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed from official transcripts of the Tanaka-Zhou discussions that agreement to “shelve” the issue, allowing future Japanese governments to fraudulently claim that the issue was not discussed and that China asserted a claim over the islands.
7,Under the circumstances above, the decision of the Noda government to “nationalize” the islands was a grave provocation, a fundamental change in the status quo, tantamount from the Chinese point of view to aggression and forceful annexation of Chinese territory. An equivalently forceful Chinese response to “balance” the level of its sovereign claim was inevitable.
What has reminded me of Whiting’s study are the many signals sent by China since the beginning of the current crisis (which might be traced back to the fishing boat incidence in 2010). In December 2011 I posted on the humiliation meted out to PM Noda during a short, seemingly purposeless–and certainly fruitless–trip made to Beijing. Already, Japan-China relations had cooled to near freezing.
Professor Yabuki chronicles the many signals of trouble as Chinese concern over the direction of Japanese policy grew. These included the refusal of Hu Jintao in February in to meet a top level delegation of seven of Japan organizations’ heads in Beijing to commemorate the 40th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic relations. The last minute cancellations of a scheduled visit to Hu Deping, son of Japan’s last “sympathizer” in the Beijing leadership, Hu Yaobang, and a visit of China’s most senior uniformed military officer, Guo Boxiong, in May.
What concerns Yabuki most is that these signals, among many others, were hardly noticed or appreciated in Japan. Yet, they were leading to what became almost a complete breakdown in communications with China. The almost farcical, but deeply tragic, denouement of this breakdown was the “16 minute standing dialogue” between Hu Jintao and Noda held on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Vladivostok on September 9 at which each side delivered its ultimatum.
The Noda Cabinet decided the next day to implement nationalization and the following day paid the money and signed documentation. It is now very hard to believe that anyone expected Japan’s decision to have the effect of de-escalating the crisis. If anyone did they were making the same mistakes as Truman and MacArthur in 1950.
最后编辑: 2013-04-08
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
日本和美国忽视中国的信号和历史，误入钓鱼岛危机(作者斯蒂芬-哈纳)
最近我读了日本最知名的中国学者之一、横滨大学名誉教授矢吹晋关于尖阁诸岛(即我钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿本网注)危机的新作。这本书的标题是《尖阁问题的核心》，副标题是《日中关系会怎样》。我认为这本书更公正客观、也更透彻地阐述了日中两国以及美国在尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛争端中的立场。
冒着过分简单化的风险，我想我可以将矢吹晋的分析和结论总结如下：
1.日本在尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛问题上的立场在好几个方面是站不住脚的，最根本的一点是，日本无条件地接受了《波茨坦公告》(该公告要求日本归还从中国“窃取的”所有领土)。
2.1985年1月明治政府吞并琉球群岛尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛被认定在其中。几个月后清政府与日本签订《马关条约》，割让台湾和澎湖列岛。这些都涵盖在《波茨坦公告》的条款中。这些岛屿过去是、现在也显然是台湾的一部分，因此台湾继续使用和占有岛屿的要求是合理的。
3.日本认为尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛是日本的领土，原因是美国1971年的《冲绳归还协定》将其给予了日本，这一立场同样与事实不符。美国给予日本的仅仅是岛屿的行政管辖权，而不是主权。主权没有转让。
4.日本的政策尤其是公众的误解基于1971年12月15日时任外务大臣福田赳夫在国会作证时的错误断言。他当时称，《冲绳归还协定》已经恢复了日本对尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛的主权。是福田误解了这个问题，还是他故意要欺骗国人，这一点并不清楚。
5.在日本对尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛实行“国有化”之前，中国处理这一领土问题的立场基于1972年田中角荣首相与周恩来总理就“搁置”这一问题达成的共识。
6.矢吹晋援引了自己的研究和第三方权威人士的观点，指责日本方面从田中与周总理会谈的官方记录中删除双方同意“搁置”该问题的共识，使得后来的日本政府得以欺骗性地声称，当时未讨论这个问题。
7.在上述情况下，野田政府将岛屿“国有化”的决定是一种严重挑衅，从根本上改变了现状，从中方的角度看等于侵略和暴力吞并中国领土。中方作出同样强有力的反应也就不可避免。 本 文 来 自 家园网 IASK.CA
最让矢吹晋担心的是，日本几乎没有注意到或重视中国发出的许多信号。
日本和美国忽视中国的信号和历史，误入钓鱼岛危机(作者斯蒂芬-哈纳)
最近我读了日本最知名的中国学者之一、横滨大学名誉教授矢吹晋关于尖阁诸岛(即我钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿本网注)危机的新作。这本书的标题是《尖阁问题的核心》，副标题是《日中关系会怎样》。我认为这本书更公正客观、也更透彻地阐述了日中两国以及美国在尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛争端中的立场。
冒着过分简单化的风险，我想我可以将矢吹晋的分析和结论总结如下：
1.日本在尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛问题上的立场在好几个方面是站不住脚的，最根本的一点是，日本无条件地接受了《波茨坦公告》(该公告要求日本归还从中国“窃取的”所有领土)。
2.1985年1月明治政府吞并琉球群岛尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛被认定在其中。几个月后清政府与日本签订《马关条约》，割让台湾和澎湖列岛。这些都涵盖在《波茨坦公告》的条款中。这些岛屿过去是、现在也显然是台湾的一部分，因此台湾继续使用和占有岛屿的要求是合理的。
3.日本认为尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛是日本的领土，原因是美国1971年的《冲绳归还协定》将其给予了日本，这一立场同样与事实不符。美国给予日本的仅仅是岛屿的行政管辖权，而不是主权。主权没有转让。
4.日本的政策尤其是公众的误解基于1971年12月15日时任外务大臣福田赳夫在国会作证时的错误断言。他当时称，《冲绳归还协定》已经恢复了日本对尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛的主权。是福田误解了这个问题，还是他故意要欺骗国人，这一点并不清楚。
5.在日本对尖阁诸岛／钓鱼岛实行“国有化”之前，中国处理这一领土问题的立场基于1972年田中角荣首相与周恩来总理就“搁置”这一问题达成的共识。
6.矢吹晋援引了自己的研究和第三方权威人士的观点，指责日本方面从田中与周总理会谈的官方记录中删除双方同意“搁置”该问题的共识，使得后来的日本政府得以欺骗性地声称，当时未讨论这个问题。
7.在上述情况下，野田政府将岛屿“国有化”的决定是一种严重挑衅，从根本上改变了现状，从中方的角度看等于侵略和暴力吞并中国领土。中方作出同样强有力的反应也就不可避免。 本 文 来 自 家园网 IASK.CA
最让矢吹晋担心的是，日本几乎没有注意到或重视中国发出的许多信号。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
楼主这么理性的分析，被一群傻X上来一通乱喷，老夫我看不下去。支持楼主一下。
楼主这么理性的分析，被一群傻X上来一通乱喷，老夫我看不下去。支持楼主一下。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
“理性的分析”需要正确的前提，否则，推导的结论都是毫无意义。这是逻辑学的基本原理。
有理说理，上来就骂别人的蠢材才真是个傻X儿子。
楼主的观点是典型的中国知识分子+绵羊理论。遇事不去对外却通过自慰来对内消化。
对钓鱼岛问题，作为个人，不仅有观点，而且“说”也是为了指导“做”。日常生活，抵制日货。真要打起来，我依旧是中国人，按照战时征兵法，服兵役，上战场，也责无旁贷。
来加拿大要活得像个“人”，首先要从自我“做”起。不只是体现在你在什么地位，挣多少加元。对吗？
“理性的分析”需要正确的前提，否则，推导的结论都是毫无意义。这是逻辑学的基本原理。
有理说理，上来就骂别人的蠢材才真是个傻X儿子。
楼主的观点是典型的中国知识分子+绵羊理论。遇事不去对外却通过自慰来对内消化。
对钓鱼岛问题，作为个人，不仅有观点，而且“说”也是为了指导“做”。日常生活，抵制日货。真要打起来，我依旧是中国人，按照战时征兵法，服兵役，上战场，也责无旁贷。
来加拿大要活得像个“人”，首先要从自我“做”起。不只是体现在你在什么地位，挣多少加元。对吗？
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
这个视频基本上就是立场争论， 国际政治阴谋说， 一点都没有从历史事实上谈钓鱼岛归属的法律细节问题。
就算是美国借助钓鱼岛问题来联合日本压制中国崛起， 那也是人家有茬可找， 不是无中生有。 你钓鱼岛事实上就在日本人手里， 不是人家用武力从你家抢走的。 你现在说想要回来， 人家就得马上拱手相送？ 就算是给也得讨个说法吧？不好好谈， 光想闹， 开口闭口动武， 不是个有实力的大国的做派， 到像是朝鲜的表演。
再说了， 到了民主国家， 也没学到点尊重个人观点的风度。 只要楼主没有在事实问题上撒谎， 没有造谣谩骂， 任何个人都没有权力去指责他是“汉奸”， 要他“谢罪”？！ 萨省的中波650电台主持人就公开说烦死魁北克了， 希望魁北克早点独立， 好像没有任何人指责发表这些言论的人为“加奸”吧？
这个视频基本上就是立场争论， 国际政治阴谋说， 一点都没有从历史事实上谈钓鱼岛归属的法律细节问题。
就算是美国借助钓鱼岛问题来联合日本压制中国崛起， 那也是人家有茬可找， 不是无中生有。 你钓鱼岛事实上就在日本人手里， 不是人家用武力从你家抢走的。 你现在说想要回来， 人家就得马上拱手相送？ 就算是给也得讨个说法吧？不好好谈， 光想闹， 开口闭口动武， 不是个有实力的大国的做派， 到像是朝鲜的表演。
再说了， 到了民主国家， 也没学到点尊重个人观点的风度。 只要楼主没有在事实问题上撒谎， 没有造谣谩骂， 任何个人都没有权力去指责他是“汉奸”， 要他“谢罪”？！ 萨省的中波650电台主持人就公开说烦死魁北克了， 希望魁北克早点独立， 好像没有任何人指责发表这些言论的人为“加奸”吧？
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
没人需要你为此去做国际法专家或考古学家或加拿大伦理顾问，这方面的高见你也就歇歇了。还是奈何桥看人看得透。
貌似有些歪理，但实质还是自己什么也不做，别人做的还不对。难道是些影子不成？甭说没用的大道理。
没人需要你为此去做国际法专家或考古学家或加拿大伦理顾问，这方面的高见你也就歇歇了。还是奈何桥看人看得透。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
说烦死魁北克，让它去独立，是没问题。但是如果他说烦死魁北克了，把魁北克送给中国吧，那你看看有没有人喷他。这么大的人了，不知道什么叫apple比apple吗？看的我好无奈。
说烦死魁北克，让它去独立，是没问题。但是如果他说烦死魁北克了，把魁北克送给中国吧，那你看看有没有人喷他。这么大的人了，不知道什么叫apple比apple吗？看的我好无奈。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
David你这段话在辩论上基本就叫做＂缴枪投降＂了。
我理解的有效辩论有三条：
１、抓对方的论据（事实）的谬误
２、抓对方的逻辑错误，比如把对方从A到B的逻辑线截断
３、很重要的一点，don't criticize your oponent, but criticize what he/she is talking about。
David你这段话在辩论上基本就叫做＂缴枪投降＂了。
我理解的有效辩论有三条：
１、抓对方的论据（事实）的谬误
２、抓对方的逻辑错误，比如把对方从A到B的逻辑线截断
３、很重要的一点，don't criticize your oponent, but criticize what he/she is talking about。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
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回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
１. 我说了把钓鱼岛送给日本？
２. 难道我该说让钓鱼岛独立？
魁北克是自己要闹独立的， 由得他送给中国？如果魁北克经过公投， 真的愿意加入中国， 恐怕加拿大也只有干瞪眼吧。
１. 我说了把钓鱼岛送给日本？
２. 难道我该说让钓鱼岛独立？
魁北克是自己要闹独立的， 由得他送给中国？如果魁北克经过公投， 真的愿意加入中国， 恐怕加拿大也只有干瞪眼吧。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
很久以前，常看CCTV的大学生辩论赛，还记得复旦好像很厉害。当时十分佩服这些学生，确实是人尖子，思维敏捷，口齿清楚。我自愧不如，理科生十分敬佩顶级文科生。
我相信这三条肯定是在他们训练的准则之中。
很久以前，常看CCTV的大学生辩论赛，还记得复旦好像很厉害。当时十分佩服这些学生，确实是人尖子，思维敏捷，口齿清楚。我自愧不如，理科生十分敬佩顶级文科生。
我相信这三条肯定是在他们训练的准则之中。
回复: 也谈钓鱼岛
魁北克我也希望他们独立。他们真的很像希腊这个国家的样子，没治了。好在魁北克有其他加拿大人养着，所以不会破产，希腊没人管，破产了事。
魁北克我也希望他们独立。他们真的很像希腊这个国家的样子，没治了。好在魁北克有其他加拿大人养着，所以不会破产，希腊没人管，破产了事。
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