回复: 管理笔记
最近家里出了点事，半夜往国内转钱，急着安慰父母，工作也不顺利，有些焦头烂额。
我的个人问题一直没解决，是不是也说明我识人能力不行？
最近家里出了点事，半夜往国内转钱，急着安慰父母，工作也不顺利，有些焦头烂额。
我的个人问题一直没解决，是不是也说明我识人能力不行？
管理笔记
- 主题发起人 storyteller
- 发布时间 2009-03-30
回复: 管理笔记
就你这样忙法，你的个人问题，看来要找熟人帮您牵线才行。解决了个人问题记得上来告诉我呀，希望您家庭事业都顺意！
就你这样忙法，你的个人问题，看来要找熟人帮您牵线才行。解决了个人问题记得上来告诉我呀，希望您家庭事业都顺意！
回复: 管理笔记
慢慢来，万事开头难。
慢慢来，万事开头难。
回复: 管理笔记
留位，待下文
留位，待下文
回复: 管理笔记
今天CEO转了篇文章，里面不少东西值得深思。
The American CEO
An idea about leadership is a major U.S. export.
by PETER F. DRUCKER
Sunday, January 2, 2005 12:01 A.M. EST
CEOs have ultimate responsibility for the work of everybody else in their institution. But they also have work of their own--and the study of management has so far paid little attention to it. It is the same work, whether the organization is a business enterprise, a nonprofit, a church, a school or university, a government agency; and whether it is large or small, world-wide or purely local. And it is work only CEOs can do, but also work which CEOs must do.
In any organization, regardless of its mission, the CEO is the link between the Inside, i.e., "the organization," and the Outside--society, the economy, technology, markets, customers, the media, public opinion. Inside, there are only costs. Results are only on the outside. Indeed the modern organization (beginning with the Jesuit Order in 1536) was expressly created to have results on the outside, that is, to make a difference in its society or its economy.
To define the meaningful Outside of the organization is the CEO's first task. The definition is anything but easy, let alone obvious. For a particular bank, for instance, is the meaningful Outside the local market for commercial loans? Is it the national market for mutual funds? Or is it major industrial companies and their short-term credit needs? All three of these "outsides" deal with money and credit. And one cannot tell from the bank's published accounts, e.g., its balance sheet, on which of these "outsides" it concentrates. Each of them is a different business and requires a different organization, different people, different competencies and different definitions of results. Even the very biggest bank is unlikely to be a leader in all these "outsides." For which of these to concentrate on is a highly risky decision and one very hard to change or reverse. Only the CEO can make it. But also the CEO must make it. It is the first task of the CEO.
The second specific task of the CEO is to think through what information regarding the Outside is meaningful and needed for the organization, and then to work on getting it in usable form. Organized information has grown tremendously in the last hundred years. But the growth has been mainly in Inside information, e.g., in accounting. The computer has further accentuated this inside focus. As regards the Outside there has been an enormous growth in data--beginning with Herbert Hoover in the 1920s (to whose work as secretary of commerce we largely owe the data on GNP, on productivity, and on standard of living). But few CEOs, whether in business, in nonprofits, or in government agencies have yet organized these data into systematic information for their own work.
One example: Every major maker of branded consumer goods knows that few things are as important as the values and the behavior of that great majority of consumers who are not buyers of the company's products, and especially information on major changes in the non-customers' values and habits. The data are largely available. But few consumer-goods manufacturers have so far converted them into organized information on which to base their decisions (one well-publicized exception is the Shell Petroleum group of companies). Again it is primarily the CEO who needs this information and whose work it is to organize getting it.
The definition of the institution's meaningful Outside, and of the information it needs, makes it possible to answer the key questions: "What is our business? What should it be? What should it not be?" The answers to these questions establish the boundaries within which an institution operates. And they are the foundation for the specific work of the CEO. Particularly:
They enable the CEO to decide what results are meaningful for the institution.
This is particularly important, particularly critical, and particularly risky for institutions that lack the discipline of the "bottom line," that is, for non-businesses. And non-businesses constitute the great majority of organizations in every developed society. But even for businesses, the bottom line is not by itself adequate as a definition of results--the same bottom line may have very differing meanings according to how an institution defines "meaningful results." To decide what results a given bottom line represents is a major job of the executive. It is not based on "facts"--there are no facts about the future. It is not made well by intuition. It is a judgment. Again, only the CEO can make this judgment, but also the CEO must make it.
This judgment is so risky that all pre-modern economies tried to avoid making it. In fact, the Modern Enterprise--the one major institutional innovation of the Modern Economy--was in large part created as the systematic risk-taker and risk-sharer, thereby enabling the individual strictly to limit the personal risk of investing in future expectations.
By thus making possible these time decisions in very large numbers and on an enormous scale, the Enterprise can be said to be the one invention that created the Modern Economy--far more so than any other invention, whether material or conceptual. With the invention of the Enterprise the Executive came into being as a distinct role and function, with one of his or her major tasks being the making of the decision between short-term yields and deferred expectations. Making this decision requires a good deal of very hard work on the part of the CEO. (Both Machiavelli's "Prince" and Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice," two Renaissance masterpieces the background of which is the emergence of the modern economy, are built around the challenge of this decision).
The answers to the question "What is our business? And what should it be?" enable CEOs to decide what is meaningful information for the business and for themselves.
This too is a high-risk decision. That U.S. business executives, for instance in the '50s and '60s, decided (in many cases quite deliberately) that what was going on in Japan was not particularly meaningful information for them and their companies, explains in large part why the Japanese export push caught them so unawares and unprepared.
It is information about the Outside that needs the most work. For far too many institutions--and not only businesses--define Outside in large part as their direct competitors. Toy makers tend to define the Outside as their toy-maker competitors; a hospital as the two competing hospitals in the same suburb, and so on. But the most meaningful competitors for the toy maker are not other toy makers but other claimants on potential customers' disposable dollars. The most meaningful information about the toy maker's Outside is therefore what value the toy presents to the potential buyer. (Customer Research, in other words, may be more important than market research--but also far more difficult).
The CEO has to decide the priorities.
In any but a dying organization there are always far more tasks than there are available resources. But results are obtained only by concentration of resources, especially by concentration of the scarcest and most valuable resource, people with proven performance capacity.
There is constant pressure on every CEO to do a little bit of everything. That makes everybody happy but guarantees that there are no results. The CEO's most critical job--also the CEO's most difficult job--is to say "No." To do so is not just a matter of will power. It requires an inordinate amount of study and work--work which only the CEO can do but again work which the CEO must do.
The CEO places people into key positions. This, in the last analysis, determines the performance capacity of the institution.
Every organization says, "We have better people." But this is, of course, impossible. Once an organization grows beyond a handful of people, it is subject to statistics' most ruthless law: the law of the great number, which dictates that there is only "normal distribution." What differentiates organizations is whether they can make common people perform uncommon things--and that depends primarily on whether people are being placed where their strengths can perform or whether, as is only too common, they are being placed for the absence of weakness. And nothing requires as much hard work as "people decisions." The only thing that requires even more time (and even more work) than putting people into a job is unmaking a wrong people decision. And again, critical people decisions only the CEO can make.
The CEO is an American invention--designed first by Alexander Hamilton in the Constitution in the earliest years of the Republic, and then transferred into the private sector in the form of Hamilton's own Bank of New York and of the Second Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. There is no real counterpart to the CEO in the management and organization of any other country. The German "Sprecher des Vorstands," the French "Administrateur Delegue," the British "Chairman," or the Japanese "President" are all quite different in their powers and in the limitations thereon.
The American CEO is, however, fast becoming a major U.S. export. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder are trying to make over their countries' top political job in the image of the U.S. president. In business the CEO model is being adopted even faster all over the world, e.g., in the recent restructuring of Europe's largest industrial complex, the German Siemens Group. And what makes the American CEO unique is that he or she has distinct and specific work.
Mr. Drucker is the author, most recently, of "The Daily Drucker," just out from HarperBusiness. This is the first in a three-part series on management.
今天CEO转了篇文章，里面不少东西值得深思。
The American CEO
An idea about leadership is a major U.S. export.
by PETER F. DRUCKER
Sunday, January 2, 2005 12:01 A.M. EST
CEOs have ultimate responsibility for the work of everybody else in their institution. But they also have work of their own--and the study of management has so far paid little attention to it. It is the same work, whether the organization is a business enterprise, a nonprofit, a church, a school or university, a government agency; and whether it is large or small, world-wide or purely local. And it is work only CEOs can do, but also work which CEOs must do.
In any organization, regardless of its mission, the CEO is the link between the Inside, i.e., "the organization," and the Outside--society, the economy, technology, markets, customers, the media, public opinion. Inside, there are only costs. Results are only on the outside. Indeed the modern organization (beginning with the Jesuit Order in 1536) was expressly created to have results on the outside, that is, to make a difference in its society or its economy.
To define the meaningful Outside of the organization is the CEO's first task. The definition is anything but easy, let alone obvious. For a particular bank, for instance, is the meaningful Outside the local market for commercial loans? Is it the national market for mutual funds? Or is it major industrial companies and their short-term credit needs? All three of these "outsides" deal with money and credit. And one cannot tell from the bank's published accounts, e.g., its balance sheet, on which of these "outsides" it concentrates. Each of them is a different business and requires a different organization, different people, different competencies and different definitions of results. Even the very biggest bank is unlikely to be a leader in all these "outsides." For which of these to concentrate on is a highly risky decision and one very hard to change or reverse. Only the CEO can make it. But also the CEO must make it. It is the first task of the CEO.
The second specific task of the CEO is to think through what information regarding the Outside is meaningful and needed for the organization, and then to work on getting it in usable form. Organized information has grown tremendously in the last hundred years. But the growth has been mainly in Inside information, e.g., in accounting. The computer has further accentuated this inside focus. As regards the Outside there has been an enormous growth in data--beginning with Herbert Hoover in the 1920s (to whose work as secretary of commerce we largely owe the data on GNP, on productivity, and on standard of living). But few CEOs, whether in business, in nonprofits, or in government agencies have yet organized these data into systematic information for their own work.
One example: Every major maker of branded consumer goods knows that few things are as important as the values and the behavior of that great majority of consumers who are not buyers of the company's products, and especially information on major changes in the non-customers' values and habits. The data are largely available. But few consumer-goods manufacturers have so far converted them into organized information on which to base their decisions (one well-publicized exception is the Shell Petroleum group of companies). Again it is primarily the CEO who needs this information and whose work it is to organize getting it.
The definition of the institution's meaningful Outside, and of the information it needs, makes it possible to answer the key questions: "What is our business? What should it be? What should it not be?" The answers to these questions establish the boundaries within which an institution operates. And they are the foundation for the specific work of the CEO. Particularly:
They enable the CEO to decide what results are meaningful for the institution.
This is particularly important, particularly critical, and particularly risky for institutions that lack the discipline of the "bottom line," that is, for non-businesses. And non-businesses constitute the great majority of organizations in every developed society. But even for businesses, the bottom line is not by itself adequate as a definition of results--the same bottom line may have very differing meanings according to how an institution defines "meaningful results." To decide what results a given bottom line represents is a major job of the executive. It is not based on "facts"--there are no facts about the future. It is not made well by intuition. It is a judgment. Again, only the CEO can make this judgment, but also the CEO must make it.
This judgment is so risky that all pre-modern economies tried to avoid making it. In fact, the Modern Enterprise--the one major institutional innovation of the Modern Economy--was in large part created as the systematic risk-taker and risk-sharer, thereby enabling the individual strictly to limit the personal risk of investing in future expectations.
By thus making possible these time decisions in very large numbers and on an enormous scale, the Enterprise can be said to be the one invention that created the Modern Economy--far more so than any other invention, whether material or conceptual. With the invention of the Enterprise the Executive came into being as a distinct role and function, with one of his or her major tasks being the making of the decision between short-term yields and deferred expectations. Making this decision requires a good deal of very hard work on the part of the CEO. (Both Machiavelli's "Prince" and Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice," two Renaissance masterpieces the background of which is the emergence of the modern economy, are built around the challenge of this decision).
The answers to the question "What is our business? And what should it be?" enable CEOs to decide what is meaningful information for the business and for themselves.
This too is a high-risk decision. That U.S. business executives, for instance in the '50s and '60s, decided (in many cases quite deliberately) that what was going on in Japan was not particularly meaningful information for them and their companies, explains in large part why the Japanese export push caught them so unawares and unprepared.
It is information about the Outside that needs the most work. For far too many institutions--and not only businesses--define Outside in large part as their direct competitors. Toy makers tend to define the Outside as their toy-maker competitors; a hospital as the two competing hospitals in the same suburb, and so on. But the most meaningful competitors for the toy maker are not other toy makers but other claimants on potential customers' disposable dollars. The most meaningful information about the toy maker's Outside is therefore what value the toy presents to the potential buyer. (Customer Research, in other words, may be more important than market research--but also far more difficult).
The CEO has to decide the priorities.
In any but a dying organization there are always far more tasks than there are available resources. But results are obtained only by concentration of resources, especially by concentration of the scarcest and most valuable resource, people with proven performance capacity.
There is constant pressure on every CEO to do a little bit of everything. That makes everybody happy but guarantees that there are no results. The CEO's most critical job--also the CEO's most difficult job--is to say "No." To do so is not just a matter of will power. It requires an inordinate amount of study and work--work which only the CEO can do but again work which the CEO must do.
The CEO places people into key positions. This, in the last analysis, determines the performance capacity of the institution.
Every organization says, "We have better people." But this is, of course, impossible. Once an organization grows beyond a handful of people, it is subject to statistics' most ruthless law: the law of the great number, which dictates that there is only "normal distribution." What differentiates organizations is whether they can make common people perform uncommon things--and that depends primarily on whether people are being placed where their strengths can perform or whether, as is only too common, they are being placed for the absence of weakness. And nothing requires as much hard work as "people decisions." The only thing that requires even more time (and even more work) than putting people into a job is unmaking a wrong people decision. And again, critical people decisions only the CEO can make.
The CEO is an American invention--designed first by Alexander Hamilton in the Constitution in the earliest years of the Republic, and then transferred into the private sector in the form of Hamilton's own Bank of New York and of the Second Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. There is no real counterpart to the CEO in the management and organization of any other country. The German "Sprecher des Vorstands," the French "Administrateur Delegue," the British "Chairman," or the Japanese "President" are all quite different in their powers and in the limitations thereon.
The American CEO is, however, fast becoming a major U.S. export. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder are trying to make over their countries' top political job in the image of the U.S. president. In business the CEO model is being adopted even faster all over the world, e.g., in the recent restructuring of Europe's largest industrial complex, the German Siemens Group. And what makes the American CEO unique is that he or she has distinct and specific work.
Mr. Drucker is the author, most recently, of "The Daily Drucker," just out from HarperBusiness. This is the first in a three-part series on management.
回复: 管理笔记
这么多字母，看得有点晕。
这么多字母，看得有点晕。
回复: 管理笔记
有家法文报纸采访了我，拍了不少照片，发表出来，公司餐厅和过道里贴了几份剪报。
我看见了过道的那一份，把它拿回了我自己的办公室放到了抽屉里。
我是不是应该让它继续挂那里？当领导有时不硬是绝对不行的，被领导的人也需要感觉到他们的领导是强有力、充满自信、鼓励个人崇拜的。
有家法文报纸采访了我，拍了不少照片，发表出来，公司餐厅和过道里贴了几份剪报。
我看见了过道的那一份，把它拿回了我自己的办公室放到了抽屉里。
我是不是应该让它继续挂那里？当领导有时不硬是绝对不行的，被领导的人也需要感觉到他们的领导是强有力、充满自信、鼓励个人崇拜的。
回复: 管理笔记
那个报纸？/想去拜读一下。
那个报纸？/想去拜读一下。
回复: 管理笔记
千万不要在下属面前质疑公司的制度和方式，只会让下属觉得你软弱、没信心。
千万不要在下属面前质疑公司的制度和方式，只会让下属觉得你软弱、没信心。
回复: 管理笔记
LZ年轻有为＋运气绝佳，羡慕！
但从这些记录里还拜读不到你的管理的基本思路和技巧。所言基本都是大家共识的东东。
顶，加油！说说你的传奇故事也不错的。
LZ年轻有为＋运气绝佳，羡慕！
但从这些记录里还拜读不到你的管理的基本思路和技巧。所言基本都是大家共识的东东。
顶，加油！说说你的传奇故事也不错的。
回复: 管理笔记
我刚来的第一周，北美的人事总监安排了一次新同事问与答，主要是我的下属问我答，其中一个问题就是，我的领导风格是什么。我先回答说，我喜欢CEO的答案，Leadership is a journey。然后说，作为中国人，我是内用老庄，外用儒术。不过估计没人明白。
我刚来的第一周，北美的人事总监安排了一次新同事问与答，主要是我的下属问我答，其中一个问题就是，我的领导风格是什么。我先回答说，我喜欢CEO的答案，Leadership is a journey。然后说，作为中国人，我是内用老庄，外用儒术。不过估计没人明白。
回复: 管理笔记
流感一来，我的运气也来了，转眼多了100多万加元的销售。
流感一来，我的运气也来了，转眼多了100多万加元的销售。
回复: 管理笔记
这两天在给员工加薪，平均涨2.5%。08年的奖金也发了。总共50万加元出去了。
我来加拿大前一直由在公司工作了16年的财务总监代理总经理。他是我在加拿大最大的障碍。这次发奖金，一分也没多给他，尽管我多发了其他经理一人几千。
这两天在给员工加薪，平均涨2.5%。08年的奖金也发了。总共50万加元出去了。
我来加拿大前一直由在公司工作了16年的财务总监代理总经理。他是我在加拿大最大的障碍。这次发奖金，一分也没多给他，尽管我多发了其他经理一人几千。
回复: 管理笔记
Mountain story
I told this story once, in a mentor session. but not completely.
I was part of a hiking team in Beijing. We went to a mountain around the city every Saturday. We got up early, leased a bus, climbed the mountain during the morning, had lunch with team, then start to go back and had couples of beers and diner together in the city. The team was korean, most of them are Korean people living in Beijing, with two exceptions, a French guy, which is my 10+ years friend, and myself. That was always good time: nice weather, magnificent mountain views, slow wind, clouds, eagles, mother nature, nice food.
Mountain story
I told this story once, in a mentor session. but not completely.
I was part of a hiking team in Beijing. We went to a mountain around the city every Saturday. We got up early, leased a bus, climbed the mountain during the morning, had lunch with team, then start to go back and had couples of beers and diner together in the city. The team was korean, most of them are Korean people living in Beijing, with two exceptions, a French guy, which is my 10+ years friend, and myself. That was always good time: nice weather, magnificent mountain views, slow wind, clouds, eagles, mother nature, nice food.
回复: 管理笔记
I had a girl friend during that time. We went to play golf several times, then I invited her to some hiking experience. The first place we went to together is Jiankou. That was superb too. The weather was so good, few people on the Great Wall, we had a little drink, ate together, all perfect.
I had a girl friend during that time. We went to play golf several times, then I invited her to some hiking experience. The first place we went to together is Jiankou. That was superb too. The weather was so good, few people on the Great Wall, we had a little drink, ate together, all perfect.
回复: 管理笔记
sorry to say: a weird story, a boring teller
sorry to say: a weird story, a boring teller
回复: 管理笔记
Usually the mountains we went to were 1400m, 1900m, 2200m or some. But once we went to Xiao Wutaishan, in Hebei. It was 2900M+, and the terribly dangerous mistake we made, was to climb it and go back in one day.
Usually the mountains we went to were 1400m, 1900m, 2200m or some. But once we went to Xiao Wutaishan, in Hebei. It was 2900M+, and the terribly dangerous mistake we made, was to climb it and go back in one day.
回复: 管理笔记
We waked up at 3am. Started to climb at 4. 1 hour after, my ex started to have tears in her eyes, telling me she no longer wanted to continue. I told her it would pay, the weather would be nice and we'd have that pleasure once at the top of mountains. Frankly I was a bit surprised by her weakness.
During the ascending period i was not always with her. She was too slow for me. The weather WAS good, but the road was really long(should be around 60km in total). By 1pm we finally arrived at one of the sommet, as always magnificent view, pure pleasure. She was tired, but also unhappy because of the fact that I was not with her. She continued to cry. I was feeling losing face in front of the team so continued to alienate her.
We waked up at 3am. Started to climb at 4. 1 hour after, my ex started to have tears in her eyes, telling me she no longer wanted to continue. I told her it would pay, the weather would be nice and we'd have that pleasure once at the top of mountains. Frankly I was a bit surprised by her weakness.
During the ascending period i was not always with her. She was too slow for me. The weather WAS good, but the road was really long(should be around 60km in total). By 1pm we finally arrived at one of the sommet, as always magnificent view, pure pleasure. She was tired, but also unhappy because of the fact that I was not with her. She continued to cry. I was feeling losing face in front of the team so continued to alienate her.
注册或登录来发表评论
您必须是注册会员才可以发表评论
注册帐号
注册帐号. 太容易了!
登录
已有帐号? 在这里登录.
